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Canada. Parliament. House of Commons.  
Standing Committee on External  
Affairs and National Defence. Special  
Committee on Peacekeeping.

Eighth Report respecting United  
Nations and Peacekeeping, 2nd Sess.,  
28th Parl.







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Parliament House of Commons



**EIGHTH REPORT  
OF THE  
STANDING  
COMMITTEE  
ON EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS  
AND NATIONAL  
DEFENCE  
RESPECTING  
UNITED NATIONS  
AND  
PEACEKEEPING**

SECOND SESSION  
28th PARLIAMENT





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**SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
ON  
PEACE KEEPING**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
CANADA

*Friday, June 5, 1970*

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

### **EIGHTH REPORT**

Pursuant to its Order of Reference dated November 3, 1969, your Committee has considered the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace, the future of peacekeeping operations and Canada's participation in them.

The Committee assigned responsibility for detailed consideration of this subject to its Subcommittee on the United Nations and Peacekeeping, under the Chairmanship of Mr. John Roberts, M.P.

The Subcommittee on United Nations and Peacekeeping has submitted its report to the main Committee. Your Committee has adopted this report, with amendments, believing that it contains most useful commentary and recommendations on the role of the United Nations and Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations. The text of the report, as amended (but without the appendices which are printed with the report in Issue No. 31 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Committee), reads as follows:

The Subcommittee on United Nations and Peacekeeping has the honour to present its

### **FIRST REPORT**

Pursuant to its delegated authority of November 4, 1969, the Subcommittee on United Nations and Peacekeeping has considered its Order of Reference on the subject-matter of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace, on the future of peacekeeping operations and on Canada's participation in them.

The Members of the Subcommittee attended the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. There they had informal discussions with officials and former officials of the United Nations and with representatives of foreign governments e.g. France, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.A.R., Sweden.

The Subcommittee held ten meetings from December 2, 1969 to May 7, 1970 and heard the following witnesses:

*Professors:* David Cox, Department of Political Studies, Queen's University; J. L. Granatstein, Department of History, York University; Alistair M. Taylor, Department of Political Studies and Department of Geography, Queen's University.

Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns.

Mr. G. Ignatieff, Ambassador of Canada to the Disarmament Commission in Geneva.

*From the Department of External Affairs:* Messrs. W. H. Barton, Head, United Nations Division; J. O. Parry, Deputy Head of United Nations Division and R. M. Tait, Head of Peacekeeping and Military Assistance Division.

*From the Department of National Defence:* Major General H. Tellier, Deputy Chief (Plans); Colonel H. C. F. Elliot, Director of International Plans; Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Lessard, Directorate of Operations.

*From the United Nations Association in Canada:* Mr. Stanley Ryan, Co-Director and Information Officer.

*From the World Federalists of Canada:* Messrs. Ross Smyth, Chairman; Andrew A. D. Clarke, and H. Weihs.

Major General F. S. Carpenter (Retired).

The Subcommittee wishes to thank the witnesses for their appearance and presentation of their testimony. The testimony of the witnesses has not appeared as printed evidence, since no Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence have been printed for Subcommittee meetings. However, informal records of hearings have been maintained, either in verbatim or in summary record form, and these have been filed as Exhibits with the Clerk of the Standing Committee. Anyone wishing to consult these Exhibits should address his request to the Clerk of the Committee.

The evidence heard by the Subcommittee covered a wide range of matters relating to United Nations actions for the maintenance of peace and security. The key question which confronted the Subcommittee was that of the future prospects for *peacekeeping*—the use of an international presence in disputes to prevent the outbreak of conflict or contain and control it when it has already erupted. Some observers have predicted a declining role for peacekeeping, and a much diminished opportunity for a Canadian contribution to it. The almost unanimous evidence, and our own conclusion, is that this is not so. For a number of reasons, which are discussed later in this report, the Subcommittee believes the opportunities for effective peacekeeping will increase.

This report deals with some of the difficulties involved in peacekeeping and presents detailed suggestions both for the organization of United Nations peacekeeping operations and for Canadian participation in their planning and execution.

In the light of the evidence before it, this Subcommittee recommends that Canada should continue her efforts in the United Nations to develop and strengthen methods and instruments of United Nations peacekeeping and should maintain and train Canadian forces available for such peacekeeping missions. The Subcommittee cannot assert too strongly its conviction that strong and tenacious advocacy of improved peacekeeping should remain a foremost priority in Canada's foreign policy.



## PART I

### United Nations Charter Provisions for the Maintenance of Peace and Security

The essential purpose of the United Nations—proclaimed in the first article of the Charter—is to assure international peace and security. The achievement of this purpose was conceived by the founding states to depend upon maintaining their war-time alliance in dealing with, and perhaps combatting, the enemy powers who had visited the scourge of war upon mankind. The United Nations was to be the continuation in peace of their victorious co-operation forged in battle,—and the instrument of that co-operation was the United Nations Charter.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Charter confers the responsibility and authority for maintaining international peace and security upon the Security Council whose permanent members were the major allied military powers. While the United Nations was precluded (Chapter I, Article 2(7)) from interfering in the domestic affairs of any state this limitation was not to prejudice the very extensive authority given (in Chapter VII) to the Security Council to restore or maintain peace by military or other enforcement actions. (*Appendix I*)

The Charter protects the predominance of the great powers in the Security Council and confirms their special position by providing to them a veto in the Council's activities. It ensures that effective action requires agreement and co-operation—or at least acquiescence—on the part of all the permanent Security Council members. It assumes the continuation of common purpose, achieved by the allies under the stress of war, as a necessary foundation to the institutions of international security.

These hopes for co-operation soon seemed remote from the realities of a world divided by cold war hostility. With the collapse of co-operation the essential task for the western nations no longer seemed the control of former enemies but the maintenance of their security against an expansionary former ally. The security provisions predicated an agreement by the great powers—a system for the regulation of armaments, the establishment of a Military Staff Committee to advise the Security Council, the negotiation of special agreements by member states to place military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council—proved impossible to implement.

Faced with the alternative of turning the United Nations into a security organization capable of protecting the western states against a fellow member of the United Nations—and thus risking the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and its friends which would disrupt the United Nations—the western nations chose to assure their security by turning to regional protective arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The objective of keeping Communist governments in the United Nations was maintained at the expense of abandoning the implementation of effective security procedures within the UN against what were, in fact, the real threats to peace.

The continuing suspicion and hostility between the super powers—even if somewhat diminished—still precludes dramatic amendment of the Charter to turn it into

an effective security enforcing institution. The members of the United Nations have proved extremely reluctant to create security arrangements through which one group of members could use force against other members even for the purpose of maintaining peace. So long as this point of view prevails, the UN will find it difficult to establish effective security enforcement procedures. This is not to suggest that the advantages to the international community of improved security arrangements would outweigh the benefits which flow from a widespread membership representing varied political interests; but it does suggest the implementation of such security arrangements is hindered by the fear of the withdrawal of major powers.

Though the United Nations has achieved much it has not yet accomplished its basic objective—the establishment of a peaceful world. The Subcommittee believes that Canada should continue to work for the evolution of the UN, both in its Charter and working procedures, to bring it closer to the effective implementation of its essential purpose—the maintenance of international security.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING

The frustration of the security mechanisms of the United Nations was accompanied by the development of a new concept—*peacekeeping*—to assist in the settlement of armed conflicts, by interposing in a dispute, disinterested forces or observers, authorized by the international community. A variety of commissions, committees, supervisors, truce bodies, observation groups, special missions, and special representatives have been sanctioned,—usually under the general permissive provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter.

The unique use of United Nations forces as a combatant party in a conflict under Chapter VII of the Charter took place as a response to the attack of North Korea against South Korea in 1950. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Security Council deliberations permitted the Council to avoid a Soviet veto of the Council's authorization of this *enforcement* action. Subsequently, in the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution (*Appendix 2*) the General Assembly asserted its right to make recommendations for the preservation of peace when the Security Council was prevented by veto from acting. There now seems general agreement that enforcement actions of this type cannot be mounted without the support of the super powers in the Security Council.

The United Nations has two types of peacekeeping forces and it is important to distinguish between them. The first type consists of *individuals*, or very *small teams*, operating simply as *observers* in a supervisory role. Examples of this type of action are:

- (a) United Nations Supervisory Commission in the Balkans (UNSCOB) 1947–1953.
- (b) United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) 1947–1951.
- (c) United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1949–19— to report and investigate violation of the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.
- (d) United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) 1954– to supervise armistice agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbours.
- (e) United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 1958–1959 to prevent illegal infiltration of arms and personnel.



- (f) United Nations Temporary Executive Administration (UNTEA) 1962–1963 in West New Guinea (West Irian). The United Nations became responsible for the administration of the territory until it was transferred to Indonesia in 1963.
  - (g) United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) 1963–1964 to supervise the implementation of disengagement agreements between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia.
  - (h) United Nations India and Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) 1965–1966 to supervise the implementation of the Security Council's ceasefire resolution.
- The second type of action is the use of *formed bodies of troops* interceding as contingents *interposed* between the two disputants in a conflict. Examples of this type of action are:
- (a) United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 1956–1967 to supervise ceasefire agreements between Israel and Egypt (U.A.R.). The force was concentrated in the Gaza Strip on the U.A.R. side of the demarcation lines with Israel. It also patrolled the U.A.R. side of the dividing line between the U.A.R. and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula, and a small detachment was stationed near the Gulf of Aqaba at Sharam-el Sheik.
  - (b) United Nations Congo Force (ONUC) 1960–1964 to assist the Congolese Government in restoring and maintaining national unity and territorial integrity, to preserve law and order, and to prevent civil war.
  - (c) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964– to prevent violent conflict between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and to restore law and order. A mediator was appointed to assist in the promotion of a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the disputes within Cyprus.
- Canada has participated in almost all of these two types of peacekeeping action. (A description of the extent and costs of this Canadian participation is presented in *Appendices 3 and 4*).

It must be stressed that these observer or “peace” forces are *not* fighting forces. The public may often misconceive the role of these forces since they are composed of soldiers. Their task is *not* to impose a policy by military action and they are forbidden to use arms except in extreme cases of self-defence. Their job is to provide on behalf of the United Nations observation, interposition, supervision and the persuasiveness of impartial international representatives. In other words, peacekeeping has shifted from the peace *enforcement* envisaged in the Charter to peace *supervision* which necessarily subordinates military considerations to the techniques of diplomacy and politics.

## THE CRISIS IN UNITED NATIONS FINANCING

Before the establishment of UNEF the costs of peacekeeping missions had been met from the regular budget of the United Nations. Only small observer missions were involved, all of which were inexpensive and, having been established by the Security Council, did not raise constitutional difficulties. The costs of the UNEF and ONUC operations were extremely high and both involved major constitutional differences. The question of how these costs were to be apportioned brought the United Nations to its most acute crisis. The United States, Great Britain, Canada and a number of other countries urged that these costs be allocated against the whole membership

according to the United Nations regular scale of assessments, with reductions to the developing countries. Behind this doctrine of collective responsibility lay the controversial concept that the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote, could bind governments to pay a share of the costs of operational activities to which they were opposed and which went far beyond the essentially administrative character of the programme financed by the regular budget. The Soviet Union, France, most of the Arab States, and some other countries refused to accept this view.

As a result of the expense of peacekeeping operations the United Nations faced a serious financial shortage by 1961. No assessments were levied to meet peacekeeping expenses during the last half of 1962. Instead, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to issue \$200 million (U.S.) in United Nations bonds as an interim measure to provide working capital to help meet the organization's needs. The sale of these bonds was used to finance peacekeeping operations during the last half of 1962 and the first half of 1963. Both the Soviet Union and France have claimed that the bond issue was a backdoor method of financing the costs of peacekeeping and have refused to pay that portion of their annual United Nations budget assessment attributable to the costs of repaying the principal and interest to the bond purchasers.

By January 1, 1964, some countries, including the Soviet Union, because of their continuing refusal to pay the contested peacekeeping costs, had accumulated such arrears that under the provisions of Article 19 of the Charter, they were liable to loss of their votes in the General Assembly. France came into the same category on January 1, 1965.

On September 1, 1965, the General Assembly agreed that the loss-of-vote sanction should not be applied and that the financial difficulties of the organization should be solved through voluntary contributions by member states.

The effects of this decision to some extent offset the force of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. For while the Uniting for Peace Resolution asserted the right of the Assembly to authorize peacekeeping, the decision on financing accepted that the costs of such operations could not be imposed on unwilling states. Peacekeeping operations would thus only be feasible to the extent that those who support the operation are prepared to pay for it. Those with the capacity to pay are, largely, the permanent powers of the Security Council—and thus their support is necessary if peacekeeping operations are to be financially practicable. Rather than face a disruption of the United Nations by Soviet Union withdrawal the Assembly accepted, in practice, the predominance of the Security Council powers.

## THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has thus far served as executive agent in the management of UN peacekeeping operations.

He derives his general responsibility from the Charter which charges him with being the "chief administrative officer of the Organization" (Article 97); and under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.



Under Articles 43 and 47 the organization of military arrangements is placed in the hands of the Security Council, and a Military Staff Committee responsible to it. These arrangements however have never become operative. In peacekeeping operations therefore, the Secretary-General has received his special authority from the authorizing resolutions of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

In order to implement these resolutions charging the Secretary-General with responsibility for organizing and managing such forces, a general management system has been developed within the U.N. Secretariat. Under this system, first Dag Hammarskjöld and subsequently U Thant have delegated much of the principal operational responsibility to one or another of the Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs. The military commander in the field reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary, who in his work had the counsel of the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, until this position was dropped from the UN's establishment in 1968.

There is a good deal of disagreement among the UN members about the discretion that ought to be allowed to the Secretary-General, with claims being made both for maintaining the widest latitude in the definition of his role, and for circumscribing his position fairly closely through institutions and procedures devised by the Security Council, and by greater precision in peacekeeping mandates.

The definition of the proper role of the Secretary-General in the authorization and control of peacekeeping is at the heart of the discussions taking place in the Committee of 33 for developing agreed procedures for handling United Nations peacekeeping activities.

### THE COMMITTEE OF 33

In February 1965, the General Assembly authorized the establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the Committee of 33). Its assignment was to undertake "a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the organization".

For three years the Committee made little progress; then, in 1968 it decided to set up a small Working Group composed of 4 great powers (France, U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R.) and 4 middle powers (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico and U.A.R.). This Working Group decided to take as the first model in its programme of work a study of *UN military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes*. (Appendix 5).

The rest of 1968 was taken up with the preparation of reference material on UN military observer missions, prepared by the Secretariat. At the insistence of the Soviet Union this documentation made no recommendations.

The Working Group began serious work in March 1969 and from then until September it met on the average about twice a week. Atmosphere in the group was good and there was a noticeable absence of propaganda speeches and polemics.

Canada has been one of the principal advocates of the need for working out agreed terms of reference for peacekeeping operations so that future requests for UN assistance can be met speedily, effectively and without risk of great power difference emerging.

Canada has submitted a detailed study (June 1968) (*Appendix 6*) and a working paper (March 26, 1969) to the Working Group (*Appendix 7*). The principal Canadian proposals concerned:

- (1) prior agreement on certain recognized procedures which would be followed by the organization and by member states after a peacekeeping operation had been authorized by the UN, e.g. with regard to the Status of Forces Agreement with the host country, the Participating State Agreements and the terms of reference of the Force Commander;
- (2) guidelines with respect to:
  - (i) the selection of the Force Commander and his staff;
  - (ii) the strength and composition of a UN force;
  - (iii) the promotion of understanding between UN personnel and the people of the host country;
  - (iv) command relationships within the UN force;
  - (v) standing operating procedures, e.g. headquarters and field organizations; operational and administrative procedures, etc.;
  - (vi) training.

Canada also recommended study of the following additional aspects of peace-keeping:

- (a) use and roles of a UN civilian police,
- (b) a United Nations headquarters planning section composed of military and civilian personnel,
- (c) a staff school to train officials (civilian and military) for peacekeeping tasks,
- (d) UN publications dealing with peacekeeping tasks,
- (e) establishment of logistic bases and need for equipment standardization.

The result of the Working Group's deliberations was agreement on a partial draft of Model I on military observer missions. The Group was able to agree on 5 of 8 proposed chapters, but no accord has been reached on:

- (1) the respective responsibilities of the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary-General for the authorization of peacekeeping operations;
- (2) the role of the Military Staff Committee, and of the Secretary-General in the day to day control of peacekeeping operations;
- (3) the method for financing peacekeeping operations.

The progress made in the Working Group, and its discussions, held in private without publicity, represented the first occasion on which representatives of the great powers have sat down together to make a serious attempt at defining the guiding principles for UN peacekeeping. The approval of a text by the Working Group is contingent on approval by home governments, the full Committee of 33 and of course, ultimately, approval by the General Assembly (to which the Committee of 33 reports) and by the Security Council itself. There are many hurdles to overcome. Moreover, agreement has still to be reached on the most difficult chapters which deal for the most part with the question of the respective authority of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

So far the Committee of 33 has not considered the principles to be applied in the use of military contingents for peacekeeping activities (Model II). It is at this level that the really difficult problems surrounding the use by the UN of military forces for peacekeeping tasks will become most evident.



Though progress in the Committee of 33 has been slow there are grounds for some optimism. There are indications that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are moving towards closer agreement on peacekeeping machinery. The decline of the cold war, tension between China and the Soviet Union, the common interest of the super powers in the settlement of such disputes as the Mid-East conflict, and in the limitation of strategic arms, have led the Soviet Union and the United States from confrontation to limited and cautious collaboration. Moreover in an age of nuclear weapons the great powers have much to fear from outbreaks of violence among the smaller powers, and, therefore, a direct interest in having such conflicts resolved by peacekeeping machinery which does not invoke their prestige and power.

The businesslike atmosphere within the Working Group reflects a will on the part of the major powers to reach some kind of accommodation on UN observer missions *if this can be done without doing violence to their basic constitutional positions*.

The United States has in the past supported the authority of the General Assembly to govern peacekeeping operations. But the United States has become less committed to this approach as its capacity to influence the decision of the Assembly has declined. The Soviet Union has been suspicious of past attempts to develop peacekeeping procedures in an *ad hoc* manner which did not conform to its interpretation of the articles of the Charter. In July 1964 the Soviet Union suggested that observer missions be governed by Chapter VI of the Charter and that other peacekeeping actions be undertaken by troop units from the smaller and middle powers (with great power participation barred) acting under the direction and control of the Security Council. More recently the U.S.S.R. has suggested that the UN Military Staff Committee, which was to have been created for the purpose of advising the Security Council with regard to the force arrangements, should be enlarged to include non Security Council members and thus associate them with the direction of peacekeeping forces.

There has been movement in both the Soviet and United States positions. The U.S.A. now seems prepared to make more use of the Security Council and to emphasize the Council's primary role in UN peacekeeping because this best reflects the realities of great power influence.

The Soviet Union has also moved from its previously rigid position. The U.S.S.R. may have concluded that it is to its advantage to enter fully into the peacekeeping picture so that it can exercise control of these operations from within, and ensure that observers or contingents are drawn from Communist bloc countries.

While these are hopeful signs, there is no guarantee of easy or quick progress. Moreover, Soviet involvement in the control and direction of future UN operations will inevitably complicate the conduct of peacekeeping. Since we have long sought to bring the Soviet Union into the picture, we must accept the consequences, one of which is that it will be much more difficult (if not impossible) in the future to mount a peacekeeping operation in the face of Soviet opposition.

## Recommendations

Doubts have been expressed to the Subcommittee concerning Canada's future role in peacekeeping. It has been suggested that the development of regional security organizations, the attachment of Canada to the western alliance, and the suspicion on the part of African and Asian peoples of white soldiers will greatly diminish the degree to which Canada will be called upon in the future to participate in peacekeeping.

Although the Subcommittee recognizes that regional organizations will probably be called upon to play a greater part in peacekeeping tasks it still expects situations in which the United Nations will be called upon to set up a force or observer mission. In these situations the Subcommittee believes that the skill of the Canadian soldiers in communications, air transportation and administration—and their experience in past peacekeeping actions—will result in a continued demand for Canadian forces. Moreover Canada's reputation as an independent member of the western alliance appears as likely to lead to her participation in peacekeeping—in the supervisory commission in Vietnam, for example,—as it is to disqualify her for it; and her close relations with Western great powers have enabled her to procure technical support which might not have been available to non-aligned countries.

The Subcommittee does not doubt the increasing need for peacekeeping—nor does it doubt that Canada will be called upon to play an important, if altered role, in assisting with peacekeeping actions. We are in a decade in which social, political and technological forces will lead to internal insecurity for many countries—especially for those newer states which are often politically unstable, economically unviable and directed by inexperienced leadership. Threats to security are as likely to be conflicts *within* states as between states. The international community has not developed—and badly needs—a coherent approach to such internal strife and the question of organizing or rejecting intervention to deal with it. This situation will increase the need for institutional substitutes for the great power police actions of the past. Properly effective peacekeeping activity will be of enormous value in defusing difficult security crises, in providing time for mediation and settlement efforts, in establishing the facts in confused situations and—above all—in reducing the chances of super-power confrontation and the dangers of escalation.

The Subcommittee is convinced that effective peacekeeping procedures must develop within a framework of consensus and consent—consent of the super powers, consent of the countries providing military units to their call-up and continued use, consent of the host country to the stationing of UN forces on its territory, consent in the provision of logistic support and consent in the financing of operations.

Most states now believe that super power acceptance is essential to the authorization of peacekeeping. It is unrealistic at the present time to envisage any major UN operation which either super power strongly opposes. The development of new peace-



keeping machinery therefore must necessarily conform to the principles of the present Charter and recognize that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

The Subcommittee emphasizes, however, that the test of success in our efforts cannot be measured simply by the degree to which we can reach agreement with the Soviet Union. Our priority should be placed not on the attainment of consensus or formal accord for its own sake, but rather on preserving the potential for an evolutionary growth in peacekeeping institutions. The Charter assigns powers and responsibilities to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General which have importance for effective peacekeeping, and their abandonment would be especially retrogressive; our search for accord must not prejudice their capacity for initiative.

## 1—AUTHORIZATION AND CONTROL

The Charter provisions for Security Council control, and the very great difficulty of establishing peacekeeping operations without great power support do indicate limits on the scope for action open to the Secretary-General. However, the Soviet assertion that the Charter ascribes to the Military Staff Committee under the Security Council the directing authority for peacekeeping would, if accepted, probably hamstringing the office of the Secretary-General. The Soviet position also denies any effective recourse to the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.

The authorization and control of peacekeeping forces is an area in which the need for flexibility and pragmatism is evident. The Subcommittee believes that it may be possible to acknowledge the political reality of the power of the Security Council, and hence go some way to meet the Soviet position, while maintaining the escape-hatch represented by the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. In view of the strong possibility of the entry of Communist China to the Security Council within the foreseeable future the Subcommittee considers it especially important to maintain the possibility of General Assembly action supported by the two super powers in the face of deadlock within the Security Council.

Solid progress in peacekeeping will depend on reaching a consensus on peacekeeping questions. The Subcommittee believes that attempts to force the development of institutional machinery more quickly than the great powers of the Security Council will accept could be counter productive. Canada and its friends should continue in an *ad hoc* way to strive for agreement where possible rather than push forward ideal plans which are practically unrealisable.

The Subcommittee suggests that an accommodation of views may be possible by distinguishing clearly between peacekeeping observer missions (Model I) and peacekeeping missions by military units (Model II). The Subcommittee believes, however, that in Model I situations it is important to develop a greater area of initiative for the Secretary-General and the General Assembly and that in relation to Model II actions the Secretary-General's role as executive agent for all UN field operations must be maintained, under whatever directions the Security Council establishes.

The Subcommittee also urges that the withdrawal procedures for a UN force—the amount of notice to be given to the United Nations and the participating countries—should be negotiated at the same time as the establishment of the peacekeeping force. Authorization should require renewal every six months.

The principle of the veto should not be extended into the day-to-day operations of peacekeeping forces.

The value of the negotiations now taking place in the Committee of 33 and the Working Group of 8 does not depend on the achievement of agreed detailed procedures for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Such agreed procedures might be of service in dealing with unexpected situations. Equally their existence might prejudice the *ad hoc* evolution of peacekeeping activity which has characterized its past fruitful development. To exchange the autonomy and executive responsibility of the Secretary-General for formal accord would sacrifice substance for ephemeral advantage. The chief value of the Committee of 33 negotiations is that they continue discussion and consideration of peacekeeping problems; so long as governments persevere in these exchanges of view the prospects for gradually developing more effective peacekeeping machinery are encouraging.

## 2—PEACEKEEPING ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

To reinforce the administration of peacekeeping forces, the Subcommittee believes the special peacekeeping administration within the UN Secretariat should be strengthened.<sup>1</sup> It should be headed by an Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and consist of personnel seconded from the UN departments with specialized experience and with functions directly related to the field operation.

The tasks of the special peacekeeping administration would include:

- (a) the direction, under the Secretary-General of field peacekeeping operations;
- (b) assistance to Member States which are providing standby or earmarked contingents;
- (c) initiation of an in-service training program;
- (d) establishment of appropriate liaison arrangements with regional organizations.

The Subcommittee has already noted that peacekeeping operations are based on the consent of the host and participating countries. They are as much political or diplomatic as military operations. The Secretary-General requires therefore an effective political or diplomatic staff to assist him in his peacekeeping efforts,—capable of being posted to troubled areas as his representatives or advising him at UN headquarters. The present arrangements do not appear completely adequate for the Secretary-General's needs, although it must be recognized that some of the deficiencies result from differences among the great powers concerning the authority of the Secretary-General in the field of peacekeeping.

## 3—MEDIATION

The United Nations is often brought into a dispute only after fighting has broken out. In these situations it is natural that the focus of attention should initially be on a ceasefire.

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<sup>1</sup>Brewster Report, *Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's*, pp. 44, 45. This report was prepared in 1968 by and for the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. In some of its recommendations the Sub-committee closely follows suggestions and wording previously put forward in the Brewster Report. These recommendations will be accompanied by a footnote citing the appropriate passages in the Report.



The Subcommittee urges that UN peacekeeping efforts in any particular situation be linked more directly with efforts at peaceful settlement of the issues underlying the dispute. Unless this is done the peacekeeping operation may cause both the UN and the parties in conflict to relax their efforts to resolve the dispute. Indeed, the incentives to settle such conflicts may be greater when fighting is still in process. The Subcommittee recommends that more attention and research be devoted to the techniques of mediation—especially those that would lead to the use of intermediary efforts by small groups of powers for the pacific settlement of conflict.

The purpose of UN peacekeeping is not to impose—or oppose—any ideological system. It should be to insulate the processes of internal politics in a conflict situation from outside interference which may threaten international peace and security. In no event should it be used to freeze a situation in such a way that social and political change cannot take place. The concept of peaceful change signifies the hope that the needed economic and social changes can be brought about without violence.

The United Nations must become more and more concerned therefore with what might be called “preventive peace-keeping”—the identification of potentially violent conflict situations and assistance in their settlement. It must also be equipped to undertake extensive mediation efforts between disputants. The objective should be to create machinery which would assist an effective Secretary-General to undertake these tasks. He needs good background and interpretative information to permit effective and knowledgeable intervention.

The development of the political staff to assist the Secretary-General which the Subcommittee has recommended should enhance the fact-finding, negotiation, conciliation and arbitration facilities which are necessary for the more effective peaceful settlement of disputes.

To diminish the risk that disputes become “frozen” by UN peacekeeping actions the Subcommittee suggests that in establishing a UN peacekeeping mission it might be useful to propose that after a given period of time, the dispute, if not bilaterally resolved, will be multilaterally treated, by automatic review by the Security Council and /or General Assembly, with new measures being required of the Organization in an effort to “unfreeze” the deadlock. Although such opportunities would occur as a result of the automatic and regular review of the authorization which the Subcommittee favours and which is likely to be the normal practice in future, the Subcommittee considers insufficient efforts have been made to date to resolve disputes.

Some have argued that the United Nations might threaten to withdraw its peacekeeping field forces unless the parties made new and serious efforts to reach agreement, and, in addition, were henceforth prepared to pay for the Organization’s presence. The Subcommittee believes that such threats are likely to prove hollow. If a situation has been sufficiently grave to warrant a peacekeeping intervention, withdrawal of a force is likely to lead to renewed violence which it would be irresponsible to risk. Moreover the costs of such violence are likely to be much greater than the expense of maintaining the peacekeeping force in place. On balance it will normally be better for a conflict to remain frozen than for it to become hot.

#### 4—PEACEKEEPING AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations (Article 52) accepts the establishment of regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security. The Subcommittee believes that the peacekeeping activities of regional institutions whose objectives are not primarily military such as the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of American States, may become increasingly important.

The Subcommittee believes that peacekeeping through the United Nations and through regional organizations can and should be mutually reinforcing. It suggests that in the future there should be closer relationship between the work of regional organizations and that of the UN. The United Nations should help these organizations to develop their peacekeeping capacity through technical assistance and, possibly, financial support arrangements.

The Subcommittee has concentrated its study on peacekeeping operations established and conducted by the United Nations. However, Canada and other active peacekeeping supporters may be asked to participate in the peacekeeping activities of regional organizations and of "ad hoc" groups such as the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. Where a regional organization has decided to undertake a peacekeeping operation, the Subcommittee considers that Canada should be willing to assist the responsible authority of the regional organization with the approval of the host nation. In instances where a peacekeeping operations is established by an "ad hoc" international conference, the Subcommittee considers that the Canadian government should be prepared to participate if it is satisfied that the conference is broadly representative of the nations interested, if the host nation extends an invitation, and if it considers international peace would be promoted by the operation.

#### 5—A STANDBY UN MILITARY FORCE

The Subcommittee recommends that the Committee of 33 explore the possibilities of developing a capable United Nations Standby Military Force, composed of units from UN Members other than the Permanent Members of the Council, supported by adequate earmarked and trained reserves.

There are indications that the U.S.S.R. may be interested in discussions on the provision of national military units to the UN Security Council (under Article 43 of the Charter) for international peacekeeping service.

The Subcommittee hopes that these discussions can be directed to the objective of establishing a standby force of 20,000 to 25,000 men from non-Permanent Members, supported by adequate earmarked reserves especially trained for UN service.<sup>2</sup> The standby units would represent four or five regiment brigade task groups of approximately 5,000 men each—3,000 active ground forces with 2,000 men in transportation and logistic support.

These standby units should be available promptly on the UN's call and would enable the United Nations to cope with most of the crisis-type situations for which UN peacekeeping action, in the foreseeable future, is likely to be effective. The establishment of such a force would, the Subcommittee believes, represent an appropriate and manageable development of the UN's capabilities.

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<sup>2</sup>Brewster Report, *Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's*, pp. 41, 43.



As a long term objective the Subcommittee recommends that arrangements be made between the Security Council and countries providing the military units to ensure that, wherever possible, these units would be available to the Security Council for a minimum of one year's service in whatever capacity the Security Council and its executive agent, the Secretary-General might direct.

UN Members not in a position to provide military units would supply bases and other facilities, including overflight privileges and prearranged rights of passage.

Certain member states would provide officer personnel on an individual basis for UN fact-finding and observation, and for the nucleus of elite cadres which would be of particular help in situations requiring fast UN reaction.

A larger UN force would require a larger number of "support personnel" for staff, communications and security functions.

The Permanent Members of the Security Council should undertake to maintain in a state of readiness logistic support for specified types of situations. One way would be to designate a specified number of types of aircraft, ships, etc. to be available on short notice if required—but not permanently tying up specific items of equipment.

The objective of a standby force which renounces a considerable degree of national sovereignty, may be impossible to implement at this time, but the Subcommittee urges that it be adopted as an ultimate goal.

In the meantime the Subcommittee hopes that forces from Soviet bloc countries will be included in future peacekeeping operations.

## 6—THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

The Subcommittee believes that the Military Staff Committee, described in Article 47, could play an important part in the design and establishment of such a force.

The UN Charter provides for the establishment of this Military Staff Committee "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament". It has not yet proven possible to implement this role.

The Subcommittee believes there can be an important role for the Military Staff Committee to advise the Security Council in peacekeeping operations. Article 47 is ambiguous as to the role of the Military Staff Committee in the management of United Nations forces once they have been activated under the Council's authority, although sub-paragraph 3 of the Article suggests that the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible "under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council". It then goes on, however, to say that "questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently".

It is obvious that no Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council (or a larger group if the recent Soviet suggestion for enlarging the Committee were to be accepted) could effectively "command" UN military forces on a day-to-day basis. We believe it important to emphasize that the Military Staff Committee's function must be purely as an advisory body to the Security Council.

## 7—A UN HEADQUARTERS MILITARY PLANNING STAFF

The Subcommittee has already recommended the establishment of a Special Peacekeeping administration in the UN Secretariat to assist the Secretary-General. In addition, a UN Headquarters Military Planning Staff—(distinct from the Military Staff Committee described in Article 47) should be established on a permanent basis with a responsibility for the following:<sup>3</sup>

- (a) to assist in the negotiations for national contributions and the realistic allocation of such forces to specific global areas in any future emergency;
- (b) the provision of transportation planning data to enable the peacekeeping administration to earmark the shipping and aircraft required to lift the contributions of member countries to their likely areas of operation in any future emergency;
- (c) the planning needed to establish military storage arrangements and facilities around the world to be available for the designated UN forces that may be required;
- (d) the drawing up and promulgation of the necessary Standing Orders and Operating Procedures to govern the conduct of UN Headquarters and its forces in an emergency;
- (e) the drafting of the various publications, curricula, and training programs to be used at a UN training centre responsible for providing courses for instructional and staff officer personnel from member countries;
- (f) the required liaison with member countries to ensure that forces earmarked for UN service provide a balanced and compatible peacekeeping force without prejudicing the military postures of the contributing countries;
- (g) the continuous examination of the use being made by the United Nations of national forces, with a view to determining whether or not present and anticipated commitments could be carried out more efficiently;
- (h) the formation of a nucleus UN field headquarters complete with skeleton administration and communication facilities;
- (i) the development of advanced communication facilities to keep effective contact with future peacekeeping missions.

## 8—A UN INTERNATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE

The Subcommittee further recommends the formation, on a permanent basis, of a UN international training centre responsible for providing training courses for personnel of member countries designated to serve with any UN Force. Personnel from member countries attending courses at the centre would receive instruction in the political, social and economic conditions in likely areas of UN peacekeeping operations. This instruction could include briefings on UN observer methods and the operational and administrative procedures followed, so far as staff work is concerned, in a UN field headquarters. Further, there is considerable merit in suggesting that the training centre be expanded to provide the UN with a proper staff college either in New York, or elsewhere.

The Subcommittee recognizes the good work which has already been done by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), which was

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<sup>3</sup>In this recommendation, the Subcommittee follows proposals put forward by R. B. Tackaberry, in *Keeping the Peace*. CIIA, Behind the Headlines Series, September 1966.



established at the end of 1963. The Institute, which is financed through voluntary contributions, began operations in 1966. It has undertaken a number of training programs and research studies, related to the objectives and programs of the United Nations, but it has so far proved politically impossible to include peacekeeping studies and training in its activities.

The Subcommittee hopes that in the long run the members of the United Nations will agree to establish the training centre as an integral part of the Secretariat. Until that time the Subcommittee recommends that governments increase their financial support to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, which is an autonomous organization, though authorized by the United Nations.

The Subcommittee also recommends that UN Members having military assistance programs which permit assistance to countries participating in international peacekeeping under the United Nations should conclude with interested countries arrangements for the training and equipping of forces to be available to the Security Council.

Middle powers with peacekeeping experience should be asked to give special technical training in language, communications, logistics and other peacekeeping arts, to officers and non-commissioned personnel from other countries.

## 9—FINANCING

In order to ease the financial difficulties under which the UN has laboured, the Subcommittee recommends that a United Nations Peace Fund be established primarily with voluntary governmental contributions.

The legacy of debt left from the United Nations Congo operation, exacerbated by the constitutional crisis over Article 19, has made the general question of financing UN peacekeeping a major issue clouding all discussions of strengthening UN's general capabilities.<sup>4</sup> No significant progress can be expected without some mutually satisfactory answer as to how future forces are to be financed and how past debts are to be met.

Three general methods have been used by the United Nations for financing peacekeeping operations:

(1) regular or special assessments; (2) costs divided between the parties to the dispute; and (3) voluntary contributions by governments.

Regular budget assessments are suitable for only the smaller UN operations, such as those on the Kashmir ceasefire line (\$1,028,100), and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East (\$4.2 million). It was the arrears under special assessments which precipitated the UN financial crisis of 1965. Payment by the parties to a dispute has proven workable for operations which were limited in size, cost and duration, such as those in West Irian and in Yemen. The Secretary-General's experience with the UN Cyprus Force has high-lighted the inadequacies of purely voluntary financing. The Force costs about \$11 million a year. The UN Cyprus account is now \$14 million in debt.

Nevertheless, of the methods which thus far have been used by the United Nations for financing peacekeeping operations, the voluntary method is the only one likely to

<sup>4</sup>Brewster Report, *Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's*, pp. 47-49.

produce anything like the funds needed for the larger UN operations. It is for this reason that the Subcommittee recommends as an objective the establishment of a voluntary Peace Fund which would be available for the initial financing of a peacekeeping operation and to meet continuing costs. The Fund would be replenished as needed. The Fund should be established at a level which would provide adequate funding of UN peacekeeping operations in the period between annual General Assemblies. This would suggest an initial Fund goal of \$60 million.

The establishment of the Fund should be accompanied by the setting up of a Special Finance Committee by the General Assembly, under rules permitting the Secretary-General to spend up to \$10 million from the Fund for authorized peacekeeping operations but requiring that additional expenditures from the Fund would be made on the recommendation of the Special Finance Committee. The Committee should be composed of those countries which are Permanent Members of the Security Council plus other UN Members selected on the basis of past contributions to peacekeeping.

This would retain the basic Charter responsibility of the Assembly for financial matters, while at the same time making certain that these decisions are effectively shaped by, and properly coordinated with, what is likely to be the larger future role of the Security Council in decisions on the disposition and use of UN peacekeeping forces.

The Subcommittee hopes that if the Committee of 33 is able to agree on financing arrangements for future operations the same formula may be applied to cover the present debts for the costs of past peacekeeping operations. The Subcommittee also hopes that it may be possible eventually to develop independent sources for peacekeeping funds—for example from the exploitation of sea-bed resources, or through an international postage surcharge.

## 10—CANADIAN POLICY

The Subcommittee commends the government for its vigorous efforts in the Committee of 33 to establish more effective peacekeeping procedures.

The Subcommittee recommends in these continuing discussions at the Committee of 33 that the government work for the eventual reorganization of peacekeeping arrangements on the lines which the Subcommittee has earlier described.

The Subcommittee endorses an *ad hoc* search for consensus on these questions, not dramatic but realistic proposals.

In designing its defence posture the Subcommittee suggests that the Government of Canada place high priority on maintaining forces earmarked for UN duty. Since each peacekeeping operation is likely to differ from previous ones, flexibility should be the key-note to our military arrangements. Above all our troops must be mobile, and capable of quick response. This will require continuance of the present programme for maintaining a force with the necessary high state of training, air transportable supplies and inoculations which equip them to leave on short notice for service anywhere. It also requires maintenance of a significant air transport capability, as well as ground forces sufficiently large that specially skilled support troops could be



detached for possible UN service without seriously depleting the overall capability of the Canadian forces.

Since the demand for Canadian troops may not be as active infantry, continued emphasis should be placed on the development of transportation, communications and military movement expertise. While special instruction and information on the UN and the problems of peacekeeping would be useful for reserve forces, the Subcommittee has concluded that the normal professional training and discipline of Canada's regular forces account for the effectiveness they have shown in past operations. It is our special administrative and technical skills, our linguistic capability and our peacekeeping experience which will be most called for in future peacekeeping situations.

The Subcommittee also recommends that the Canadian Government provide financial support for private organizations such as the International Peace Academy which are promoting research and training in the techniques of peacekeeping. The Subcommittee was greatly impressed by the testimony presented to it concerning the International Peace Academy, and its plans, and urges the Canadian Government to provide financial support for such work.

The Subcommittee also believes that such work as that of the Canadian Peace Research Institute into the causes and prevention of conflict should continue to receive government support.

The Subcommittee further recommends that government support publicity and information programs designed to acquaint the public, and especially young people, with the peacekeeping role of the United Nations.

The Subcommittee has emphasized several times its conviction that Canada will be called upon to continue to play an important, if altered role, in peacekeeping actions. The next decade promises to be dominated by social, political and technological forces which are likely to lead to internal insecurity and clashes between states—especially for those newer states often confronted at the same time by the intractable problem of divisive nationalisms, poverty and inexperience. This situation will increase the need for effective peacekeeping to defuse conflicts and provide time for mediation and settlement efforts and—above all—to reduce the chances of superpower confrontation.

The existence of a great and growing need does not in itself ensure that the institutions to meet it will develop. We must not expect dramatic and immediate progress.

The work of peacekeeping is not glamorous. It is costly. It is frustrating. It does not inspire gratitude. It does not directly assist narrow Canadian national interests. But it is an essential service—and one for which Canada has special qualification, because of her experience, because of her reputation for fairness, and because of her technical skills.

Support for peacekeeping has been a principal element in Canada's post-war foreign policy. The need for our continuing and active support for it has not diminished with the passage of time. For Canada now to lose heart, and reduce its interests in peacekeeping would be an abdication of responsibility. No other country could fill the gap thus opened—and the development of effective peacekeeping would be set back with incalculable, but certainly disastrous, effect.

The Subcommittee cannot assert too strongly its conviction that strong and tenacious advocacy of improved United Nations peacekeeping should remain a foremost priority in Canada's foreign policy.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Issue No. 31*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

IAN WAHN,  
*Chairman.*

## Appendix 1

# ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER ON THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

## CHAPTER I

### PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

#### *Article 1*

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

#### *Article 2*

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article I, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.



6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

#### COMPOSITION

##### *Article 9*

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

#### FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

##### *Article 10*

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 21, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

##### *Article 11*

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such question to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

## *Article 12*

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

## *Article 13*

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

(a) promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

(b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

## *Article 14*

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

. . .

## VOTING

## *Article 18*

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

## CHAPTER V

### THE SECURITY COUNCIL

#### COMPOSITION

##### *Article 23*

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

#### FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

##### *Article 24*

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

##### *Article 25*

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

##### *Article 26*

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and eco-



conomic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

#### VOTING

##### *Article 27*

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

#### CHAPTER VI

#### PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

##### *Article 33*

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

##### *Article 34*

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

##### *Article 35*

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

### *Article 36*

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

### *Article 37*

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

### *Article 38*

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

## CHAPTER VII

### ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

### *Article 39*

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

### *Article 40*

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

#### *Article 41*

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

#### *Article 42*

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

#### *Article 43*

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

#### *Article 44*

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

#### *Article 45*

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.



#### *Article 46*

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

#### *Article 47*

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

#### *Article 48*

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

#### *Article 49*

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

#### *Article 50*

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

#### *Article 51*

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-

national peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## CHAPTER VIII

### REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

#### *Article 52*

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of articles 34 and 35.

## Appendix 2

### GENERAL ASSEMBLY “UNITING FOR PEACE” RESOLUTION

377 (V) 1950

#### *The General Assembly*

*Recognizing* that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”, and

“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”,

*Reaffirming* that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

*Finding* that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,

*Recalling* its resolution 290 (IV) entitled “Essentials of peace”, which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

*Reaffirming* that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

*Conscious* that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

*Recognizing* in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,



*Recognizing* that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

## A

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

## B

3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. *Decides* that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. *Recommends* to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297B (IV);

## C

7. *Invites* each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. *Recommends* to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. *Invites* the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

## D

11. *Establishes* a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of the Present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter);

12. *Recommends* to all Member States that they cooperate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

## E

14. *Is fully conscious* that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the

Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries; and accordingly

15. *Urges* Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under-developed countries and areas.

## ANNEX

The rules of procedure of the General Assembly are amended in the following respects:

1. The present text of rule 8 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule, and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:

“Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution 377A (V) shall be convened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for such a session from the Security Council, on the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9.”

2. The present text of rule 9 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:

“This rule shall apply also to a request by any Member for an emergency special session pursuant to resolution 377 A (V). In such a case the Secretary-General shall communicate with other Members by the most expeditious means of communication available.”

3. Rule 10 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

“... In the case of an emergency special session convened pursuant to rule 8 (b), the Secretary-General shall notify the Members of the United Nations at least twelve hours in advance of the opening of the session.”

4. Rule 16 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

“... The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the communication summoning the session.”

5. Rule 19 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

“... During an emergency special session additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution 377 A (V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting.”

6. There is added a new rule to precede rule 65 to read as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly, in case of an emergency special session, shall convene in plenary session only and proceed directly to consider the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee;



the President and Vice-Presidents for such emergency special sessions shall be, respectively, the Chairman of those delegations from which were elected the President and Vice-Presidents of the previous session.”

*302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.*

For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter,

*The General Assembly*

*Recommends to the Security Council:*

That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee;

The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution 377 A (V).

*302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.*

*The General Assembly*

*Recognizing* that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations,

*Recognizing* the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

*Recognizing* that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled “Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace”,

*Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that:*

(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter;

(b) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations.

*302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.*

### Appendix 3

#### COSTS (\$) OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS TO CANADA

The following are the estimated costs of Canadian participation in United Nations operations from inception to about 15 June, 1969:

OPERATION		RECOVERABLE COSTS	NON-RECOVERABLE COSTS
UNEF	(Egypt)	\$20,508,500	\$44,276,500
ONUC	(Congo)	7,240,000	5,760,000
UNFICYP	(Cyprus)	2,673,800	14,381,100*
UNTSO	(Palestine)	—	299,000 (annually)
UNMOGIP	(India/Pakistan)	—	246,000 (annually)
(incl. Observers		—	
UNIPOM)	Air Support	1,344,435	
UNTEA	(New Guinea)	156,000	47,000
UN	(Lebanon)	—	147,000
UN	(Yemen)	420,000	135,000
UNIMAC	(Korea)	—	28,000 (annually)

\*During the same period the normal pay and allowances for the Canadian Forces in Cyprus was estimated at about \$23,000,000.

As far as UNFICYP is concerned it is estimated that from March 1964 to 15 December, 1969 the costs to Canada will be as indicated below:

Recoverable Costs, \$2,953,800

Non-Recoverable Costs, \$15,094,582

Pay and Allowances, \$24,413,164

# Appendix 4

## CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

SERIAL	OPERATION	DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION	FROM-TO	PRESENT NUMBERS INVOLVED	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	United Nations Military Observer Group India / Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Kashmir	19 Military Observers, Caribou aircraft and 3 officers and five ground crew.	1949 to date	9 Observers plus 8 aircrew	During the period covering the India-Pakistan confrontation the number of Cdn. Observers was increased from 9 to 19. <i>Tour of duty is one year.</i>
2	United Nations Command Korea	RCN—3 destroyers Army—1 Infantry Brigade Group RCAF—1 Air Transport Squadron with USAF Military Air Transport Service, 21 fighter pilots with 5th USAF. Total manpower commitment at peak of war approximately 8,000 all ranks.	1950-54 last formed unit to serve in Korea was an Army Field Ambulance	Canadian Liaison Officer and NCO Clerk with the U.N. Military Armistice Commission	
3	United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) Palestine	Maj.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, DSO, OBE, MC (promoted to Lt.-Gen. in 1956), served as Chief of Staff 1954-1956 together with complement of Canadian Observers.	1954 to date	20	<i>Tour of duty is one year.</i>
4	International Commissions for Supervision and Control as established by 1954 Geneva Agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.	At height of operation Cdn. service personnel were serving in all these countries and it represented a commitment of approximately 100 officers and other ranks, together with External Affairs officers and staff.	1954 to date	9 officers and 11 other ranks	Tour of duty for military personnel is one year.
5	United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) Egypt	Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns served as first Commander of UNEF. Initial contribution Air Communications Squadron equipped with <i>Other</i> aircraft, administrative and communication troops with subsequent addition of reconnaissance squadron. March number 1007.	1956 to 1967		



6	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	77 all ranks.	1958-59	NIL	
7	United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC)	Air Advisors and air transport support together with some 316 all ranks; staff officers, administrative and communication personnel.	1960-64	NIL	
8	United Nations Temporary Executive Administration (UNTEA) West New Guinea (West Irian)	Air detachment of 2 <i>Otter</i> aircraft and 5 officers and 8 ground crew.	1962-63	NIL	
9	United Nations Observer Mission Yemen (UNYOM)	Observers and air detachment of 2 <i>Caribou</i> and 3 <i>Otter</i> aircraft for total of 36 servicemen.	1963-64	NIL	
10	United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Canadian contingent composed of headquarters element, standby battalion and reconnaissance squadron. Canada also provided UN with personnel, including Commander, for Zone (Bde) HQ for total of 1126. Before reorganization in 1965.	1964 to date	Zone Headquarters has been eliminated as result of reorganization 1965. Present strength stands at 579.	Tour of duty is six months.
11	United Nations India/Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	Maj.-Gen. B. F. Macdonald, DSO, CD, appointed Chief Officer. Canada also provided Senior Air Advisor and staff, 12 observers and 117 Air Transport Unit RCAF for total commitment of approximately 112.	1965-66	NIL	Disbanded Mar. 22, 1966.

## Appendix 5

### UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Document A/7742

3 November 1969

Twenty-fourth session

Agenda item 35

#### COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

*Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations*

*Rapporteur: Mr. Abdel Halim BADAWI (United Arab Republic)*

1. At its twenty-third session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the reports of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations<sup>1</sup>, adopted resolution 2451 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, which read as follows:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, 2053 A (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2249 (S-V) of 23 May 1967 and 2308 (XXII) of 13 December 1967,*

*"Having received and examined the reports of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations of 2 July 1968 and 12 December 1968,*

*"Mindful of the importance which Member States attach to the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects,*

*"Noting that the Special Committee has appointed a working group for the preparation of working papers for the study that the Special Committee was requested to submit to the General Assembly in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of its resolution 2308 (XXII)*

*"Noting that the Special Committee has approved, as a first model in the programme of its working group, a study of the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Council resolutions,*

*"Noting further from the report of the Special Committee of 12 December 1968 that preliminary work has been undertaken in the preparation of the above-mentioned study,*

*"1. Requests the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue its work under General Assembly resolution 2308 (XXII), including the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of that resolution;*

*"2. Reiterates its request to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to keep the General Assembly regularly informed about its progress in the comprehensive review of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects;*

*"3. Further requests the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to submit to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its*

<sup>1</sup>Official Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-third Session. Annexes, agenda item 32, documents A/7131 and A/7396.

twenty-fourth session, a comprehensive report on the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Council resolutions, as well as a progress report on such work as the Special Committee may be able to undertake on any other models of peace-keeping operations;

“4. *Transmits* to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations the records of the debates at the recent session on the item entitled ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects’, with the request that the suggestions and proposals contained therein be taken into account.”

2. At its 37th meeting, on 14 February 1969, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations unanimously elected Mr. Yvon Beaulne (Canada) as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the Special Committee to succeed Mr. George Ignatieff (Canada), and Mr. Abdel Halim Badawi (United Arab Republic) as Rapporteur to succeed Mr. Shaffie Abdel-Hamid (United Arab Republic).

3. At the same meeting, the Chairman drew the attention of the Special Committee to the terms of General Assembly resolution 2451 (XXIII), particularly as it related to the study of military observers authorized or established by the Security Council pursuant to Security Council resolutions. He also informed the Committee that the material prepared by the Secretariat on the United Nations military observers, including the additional information requested of the Secretariat by the Working Group, would be placed at the disposal of the members of the Committee as soon as possible. The Special Committee then agreed that the Working Group should continue its work and keep the Committee informed of its progress.

4. At the 38th meeting, on 25 June 1969, the Chairman informed the members of the Special Committee of the progress of the work of the Working Group. He stated that, by a letter dated 23 May 1969, he had informed the members of the Committee that the material on the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to the Security Council's resolutions was available to them. He also stated that the Secretariat had been authorized to make this material available to Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Special Committee, if they so requested.

5. With regard to the drafting of model I, dealing with military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions, the Chairman stated that the Working Group had begun its work. The Chairman added that the members of the Working Group were conscious of the fact that the Working Group was a subsidiary body of the Special Committee charged with a specific mandate and that it was endeavouring in the best way possible to facilitate the work which was within the purview of the Committee as a whole.

6. At the 39th meeting of the Special Committee, on 15 September, the Rapporteur submitted the first report of the Working Group (A/AC.121/L.8), which is reproduced as annex I of this report. In introducing the Working Group's report, the Rapporteur stated that it described in general terms the progress achieved thus far. He added that the brevity of the report should not be construed as denoting lack



of progress, for the exchanges of views in the Working Group had been very valuable and had dealt with substantive issues.

7. The Chairman, in commenting on the work done by the Working Group, said that it had hoped to submit to the Special Committee a complete draft of model I, as well as a schema for model II. Unfortunately, that had proved to be impossible. However, in his view, the Working Group had made a certain amount of progress which, although limited, was none the less significant. Speaking of chapter II, dealing with the Establishment (formation, strength, composition and command), direction and control, chapter III, dealing with Legal arrangements, and chapter IV, dealing with Financial arrangements, of the schema of model I, the texts of which the Working Group was not able to complete, the Chairman stated that the Working Group had discussed in depth all the questions to be covered in those chapters. In connexion with model I, the Chairman stressed that it referred exclusively to military observer missions established or authorized by the Security Council and did not constitute a precedent that would affect other types of peace-keeping operations.

8. In the course of the discussion, which took place at the 39th to 42nd meetings, some members of the Special Committee expressed regret that, despite its hard work, the Working Group had been unable to submit to the Committee a complete draft of model I. They noted, however, that the Working Group had to deal with questions of principle which were complex and delicate and in connexion with which serious differences had existed in the past which affected the United Nations fundamentally in its existence. It had been estimated that these problems could not be resolved except through a patient approach and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and goodwill. They had declared that these conditions appeared to have the best chances of realization within the Working Group. Some members, while noting that progress had been slow, also expressed the view that some real advance had finally been made. They noted in particular that, while not all the problems had been solved, the issues involved had been fully and frankly discussed in the Working Group. They felt that there was more reason now than in the past for believing that the fundamental problems facing the Committee would be solved. Some other members expressed satisfaction at the progress so far made. They felt that the Working Group had no need to apologize for the results achieved. The Working Group had completed five chapters, and on the remaining three it had held intensive negotiations and had reached a substantial measure of agreement. They believed that if the Working Group's mandate was continued, it might be able to solve hard-core problems. References were also made to closer co-operation among all the members of the Special Committee. The Chairman recalled that the meetings of the Working Group were open to members of the Special Committee, who could attend, and he stated that, in order to facilitate this closer co-operation, future meetings of the Working Group would be announced in the *Journal of the United Nations*.

9. Consultations have been under way concerning the possible title and framework of a model II, which would deal with United Nations peace-keeping operations on a larger scale. The Committee hopes to be able to begin study of such a model at an early date.

10. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations therefore recommends that the General Assembly authorize it to continue its work in order to present a comprehensive report to the Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.

## Annex

### FIRST REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP

*Rapporteur*: Mr. Abdel Halim BADAWI (United Arab Republic)

1. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in its first report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session,<sup>a</sup> dated 2 July 1968, stated that on 8 April 1968 it had established a Working Group composed of the four officers of the Committee (Mexico—Chairman; Canada and Czechoslovakia—Vice-Chairman; and the United Arab Republic—Rapporteur) and four other members, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. It also stated that the Working Group had approved “as the first model in its programme of work a study of the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to the Council resolutions”. It may be recalled that the Special Committee decided that this would mean studying the following:

(a) The strength and equipment of the group of observers; their recruitment and organization; facilities and services; financial questions;

(b) The relationship between observers and the State or States on the territory or territories of which they have to operate;

(c) The status of observers; privileges and immunities; duration and termination of the mission of observers.

Further, it was stated that the Working Group had requested the Secretariat to provide the following material: first, a compilation of the statements made in the Security Council and in the Special Committee on the military observers established or authorized by the Security Council; and second, a report containing all the documents and materials available in the Secretariat which refer to the military observers established or authorized by the Security Council.

2. In a second report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session,<sup>b</sup> dated 12 December 1968, the Special Committee stated that the material requested by the Working Group had been made available to it by the Secretariat in two volumes in September 1968, and that in the course of a preliminary consideration of that material the Working Group had made observations concerning the material and had requested that the Secretary-General supply additional factual information.

3. During the discussion of the above-mentioned reports of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations by the Special Political Committee at the twenty-third session and in response to expressions of interest in the material prepared by the Secretariat, the Chairman of the Special Political Committee stated that an understanding had been reached that as soon as the additional factual material was provided by the Secretariat, appropriate steps would be taken by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to make the material available without delay, for information, to any other interested delegations.

4. The General Assembly in its resolution 2451 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, requested, *inter alia*, “the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to submit

<sup>a</sup>Official Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-third Session. Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/7131.

<sup>b</sup>*Ibid.*, document A/7396.

to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-fourth session, a comprehensive report on the United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Council resolutions, as well as a progress report on such work as the Special Committee may be able to undertake on any other models of peace-keeping operations”.

5. At its 37th meeting, on 14 February 1969, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations agreed that the Working Group should continue its work and keep the Special Committee informed of its progress.

6. The Working Group resumed its work on 25 March 1969. During the period from 25 March to 11 September 1969, the Working Group held forty-nine meetings. In addition, the members of the Working Group held a number of informal meetings for the purpose of consultation.

7. The additional factual information referred to in paragraph 2 above had been presented to the members of the Working Group by the Secretariat in February 1969. This additional information, together with the original material made available by the Secretariat in September 1968, was considered by the Working Group at its meetings in March and the first half of April. After consideration, the Working Group agreed to request the Secretariat to incorporate the additional information into the original material and also to make certain revisions, including the deletion of some passages. On 15 April 1969, the Working Group further agreed that the revised material should be reproduced. Subsequently, by a letter dated 23 May 1969, the Chairman informed the members of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations that in accordance with the statement made by the Chairman of the Special Political Committee, referred to in paragraph 3 above, and with the approval of the members of the Working Group, the material would be available to the members of the Special Committee. Further, the Working Group authorized the Secretariat to make this material available to Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Special Committee, if they so requested.

8. In drafting model I (Military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions), the Working Group had before it the following three working papers covering various aspects relating to that model:

- (a) Working Paper submitted by Canada on 26 March 1969;
- (b) Working Paper submitted by the United States of America on 3 April 1969;
- (c) Working Paper submitted jointly by Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 23 April 1969.

9. On the basis of these three working papers, of drafts covering specific questions submitted by its members and of views expressed during the discussion, the Working Group first agreed on a schema of the model containing eight chapters. It then proceeded to elaborate the text of these chapters. In the course of its work, the Working Group was able to complete the text of five of the eight chapters. With regard to the three other chapters, namely chapter II, dealing with the Establishment (formation, strength, composition and command), direction and control, chapter III, dealing with Legal arrangements, and chapter IV, dealing with Financial arrangements, the Working Group has not yet been able to work out complete texts. However, the Working Group has had valuable discussions on all elements to be included



in these chapters and has indicated the general direction to be followed in completing the work on them. It believes that a continuation of its work along these lines will help promote the completion of model I.

10. In the course of its discussion on chapter III, dealing with Legal arrangements, the Working Group also considered the draft of a standard agreement between the United Nations and the host country on the status of military observer missions.

11. The schema of model I is contained in the appendix to this report.

12. Consultations have been under way concerning the possible title and framework of a model II, which would deal with United Nations peace-keeping operations on a larger scale. The Working Group hopes to be able to begin study of such a model at an early date.

## Appendix to Annex

### MODEL I

#### United Nations military observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions

#### Contents

##### CHAPTER I Authorization

##### CHAPTER II Establishment (formation, strength, composition and command), direction and control

###### A. *General considerations*

1. Promptness of the Security Council's actions
2. Assistance to the Security Council on military questions
3. Role of the Secretary-General

###### B. *Strength and structure of the Military Observer Mission*

###### C. *Composition of the Military Observer Mission*

1. Earmarked personnel and technical services
2. Concurrence of host country
3. Participation of Member States

###### D. *Appointment of the chief of the Military Observer Mission and staff officers*

###### E. *Direction and control*

##### CHAPTER III Legal arrangements

###### A. *General principles*

###### B. *Agreement on the status of military observer missions between the United Nations and the host country*

###### C. *Agreements between the United Nations and States providing personnel, equipment facilities and services*

##### CHAPTER IV Financial arrangements

###### A. *Responsibility for over-all cost of the Military Observer Mission*

1. Advance estimate
2. Method and sources of financing

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## Appendix 6

### UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Document A/AC. 121/17

19 June 1968

#### SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

#### LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

I wish to refer to resolution 2308 (XXII) of 13 December 1967 by which the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations was authorized to undertake a study on "matters related to facilities, services and personnel which Member States might provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, for United Nations peace-keeping operations". In your statement on 4 March 1968 in the Committee you invited member States of the Committee to co-operate with you by making their own contributions to the study, either orally or in writing, as they saw fit.

My authorities are glad to be able to respond to this invitation in the form of the attached commentary on certain aspects of peace-keeping operations. Part I entitled "Canadian Armed Forces Participation in Peace-keeping Operations and Observer Missions" recalls Canadian military policy in relation to peace-keeping as it was enunciated in the White Paper on Defence published by the Canadian Government in 1964. Part I also describes current Canadian standby arrangements for peace-keeping. Part II of the commentary entitled "Procedures for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Observer Missions" contains a statement of Canadian views on certain considerations relating to the status of United Nations peace-keeping forces and missions and to the facilities, services and personnel which Member States might provide for such forces and missions.

I look forward to the opportunity of outlining the general views of the Canadian Government on peace-keeping at the next appropriate opportunity provided by the meetings of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. Meanwhile, I should like to emphasize my Government's belief that the experience already gained by a number of Governments and by the Secretariat in the field of peace-keeping can be put to good use in preparing for future contingencies which may call for the use of military personnel under United Nations auspices, whatever differences may now divide Member States on the authorization and control of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, together with the attached commentary, circulated as a document of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) George IGNATIEFF

Ambassador and Permanent Representative

FACILITIES, SERVICES AND  
PERSONNEL WHICH MEMBER  
STATES MIGHT PROVIDE IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE CHARTER OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS  
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:



A Canadian Commentary Submitted  
as a Contribution to the Study  
Authorized by Resolution  
2308 (XXII).





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## PART I

# Canadian Armed Forces Participation in Peacekeeping Operations and Observer Missions

### *Introduction*

1. It is now almost 20 years since the first Canadian servicemen were assigned to United Nations duty. In that period more than 46,000 Canadians have served a tour of duty under the blue and white United Nations flag or under other international peacekeeping arrangements.

2. It has become the normal Canadian practice to meet peacekeeping commitments with regular members of the Canadian Armed Forces. At the present time members of the Canadian Armed Forces are participating in three different United Nations peacekeeping operations and observer missions—United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). They also participate in support of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which were set up in 1954 within the context of the Geneva Ceasefire Agreements of that year and outside the framework of the United Nations. Approximately 1,000 officers and men are serving overseas in support of these various commitments. Annex A to this paper gives details of past and current Canadian participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations and observer missions.

3. The purpose of Part I of this paper is to outline the capability of Canadian Armed Forces to participate in peacekeeping operations and observer missions. Such participation is determined by a decision of the Canadian Government in response to a request for Canadian participation following a decision by an appropriate organ of the United Nations to set up a peacekeeping operation or observer mission.

4. The following extracts from the "White Paper on Defence" issued by the Canadian Minister of Defence in March 1964 provide a general indication of Canadian military planning for possible peace-keeping assignments:

- a. "Canada's own experience in this field (peace-keeping) points to the need for a high degree of versatility in preparing for possible United Nations service. In the past, requests from the United Nations for assistance have been for specialists of various kinds, mainly from the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)"
- b. "Preparations for United Nations service on the part of Canadian military personnel must be varied with an emphasis on mobility. While the training and equipment of such forces may be of a special nature, the best results can be accomplished through the establishment of regular military formations, which need not be earmarked exclusively for United Nations service and which can be used for other roles as required".

- c. "Canadian forces will be trained and equipped in a way which will permit immediate and effective response to United Nations requirements. The training will include a wide variety of specialized capabilities to permit units to operate in extreme conditions from arctic to jungle, and to undertake tasks of varied complexity from Firefighting to communications. The key to organization will be flexibility and mobility".
- d. "The combined land, sea and air forces normally stationed in Canada and at Canadian ports will be sufficiently flexible to satisfy almost any conceivable requirement for United Nations or other operations".

### *Standby Arrangements*

5. Canada follows a procedure of placing certain military personnel and units on a standby basis for purposes of quick response in the event of need. These personnel and units, while on a standby tour, undergo training designed to meet the particular requirements for observer missions and peacekeeping operations. Together with other elements of the Canadian forces they are assigned a number of responsibilities under a system of priorities to be applicable in particular circumstances. This practice of "multiple tasking" precludes the exclusive assignment, in advance, of Canadian Forces personnel or units to specific tasks. But it allows for quick response if and when the Government decides to meet a request for Canadian personnel for peacekeeping. Past experience has shown that Canada has been able to meet most of the requests made by the United Nations.

6. The functional commanders of the Canadian Armed Forces are responsible for the preparation of a wide variety of elements for possible commitment to peacekeeping tasks. The capabilities of the three environmental components are described in some detail in the following paragraphs.

### *Naval Forces*

7. The availability of a modest sealift capability provides the Canadian Armed Forces with some planning flexibility for deployment and redeployment that is most useful. It is planned to increase this capability over the next few years so that the movement of forces assigned to the United Nations or other international authority can be carried out by the most efficient combination of air and sea lift. Although participation in sealift operations is not the type of operation normally undertaken in peacetime by the maritime forces, the role is, to some degree, compatible with their other national peacetime missions. Therefore, subject to their availability for peacekeeping tasks, it is easier to ready maritime forces for peacekeeping operations than is the case for the land forces.

8. All Canadian naval elements are liable for possible assignment to peacekeeping tasks, subject to other peacetime commitments. Normally this would include an aircraft carrier or an operational support ship or both.

9. In addition to peacekeeping tasks based on their inherent operational characteristics, naval elements are capable of performing one or a combination of the following tasks in support of other forces:

- a. Transport support lift for mobile forces; and
- b. Provision of limited command, control and hospital facilities afloat for deployed mobile forces.



### *Land Forces*

10. The provision of land elements is subject to two factors which do not weigh as heavily with regard to naval and air elements:

- a. Possessing no inherent strategic mobility, their scale and speed of deployment depend on the air and sealift which can be made available;
- b. Coming from a small standing military establishment such as Canada's, their size and nature depend to a degree on the capability of that establishment to maintain rotation.

11. A further consideration which would have to be taken into account in assessing Canadian capabilities for new land operations is the requirement to maintain current peacekeeping commitments of approximately 1,000 all ranks.

12. Examples of land elements which might be available if requested for peacekeeping service are:

- a. Headquarters element for a zone or district such as the provided for Nicosia Zone UNFICYP.
- b. Reconnaissance element such as that provided for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) or UNFICYP.
- c. Signals element such as that provided for UNEF or United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).
- d. An infantry battalion group, such as that despatched to and being maintained in Cyprus.
- e. An administrative and logistic support element such as that provided for UNEF and ONUC.

13. In addition to maintaining current commitments to peacekeeping tasks, Canada maintains in Canada one battalion group, or equivalent, able to respond within seven days notice to a further peacekeeping commitment.

### *Air Forces*

14. The capability of Canadian air forces in the field of peacekeeping is indicated by the nature of the Canadian contribution of air personnel and units to a number of peacekeeping operations as reflected in Annex A. For UNEF in 1956, this support included the services of a senior officer as Air Adviser to the Force Commander and an air communications squadron, later designated 115 Air Transport Unit (ATU). The same type of air force unit was provided for the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in the autumn of 1965. For the Congo operation, the air force provided air transport, the air advisory staff and the air controllers for all airfields used by the United Nations; 11,746 passengers and over 4,000,000 pounds of freight were carried by the Canadian air force in support of this operation.

15. The air forces, provided they are not committed to other peacetime tasks, have little or no difficulty in meeting peacekeeping assignments, particularly those involving air transport. Normally the air forces will provide airlift support for Canadian or other forces engaged in peacekeeping operations. Tactical air support elements may also be made available under particular circumstances. The extent of the airlift available for any peacekeeping operation would depend on the extent to which the air forces were employed on other missions at the time the request was received.

### *Factors Affecting Standby Arrangements*

16. Up to this time no two peacekeeping operations have been alike. Such operations are usually, in the first instance, the primary concern of the land forces. However, experience has shown that with minor exceptions most peacekeeping operations involve naval and air forces as well. The nature of the task determines the composition of the force which is raised, e.g. the number of infantry units, the proportion of supporting arms, communications, engineers, reconnaissance, as well as the number of aircraft and ships required. It is against this background of uncertain requirements that Canada has endeavoured to provide general capabilities rather than to earmark specific units designed for special tasks.

17. To date, however, it has been the Canadian practice to designate an infantry battalion, on a rotational tour basis, as the Standby Battalion. Supporting elements for the battalion, a contingent headquarters and observer personnel are also designated for this role. The battalion establishment can be suitably modified and it can be re-equipped to meet the requirements of an airtransportable unit capable of quick response (seven days to any destination within a 5,000 mile radius from the departure airfield) to United Nations or other peacekeeping assignments.

18. The Standby Battalion, with a strength of some 657 all ranks, is organized into a headquarters, a support company (medicals, communications, stores, administration, maintenance, engineers and finance) and four rifle companies. The independent and specialist role of this unit requires that it be augmented by the increments needed to meet the demands of a Canadian contingent assigned to a peacekeeping task. The increments include a contingent advance party, commanded by an officer in the rank of colonel, known as the contingent commander; the personnel required to form the land force components of airfield staffs and certain logistic and administrative personnel needed to support the battalion in an area remote from Canadian bases. The number of personnel involved, including the advance party headquarters, totals 88 all ranks for a possible contingent strength of 745.

19. The greater part of the manpower of the Standby Battalion is concentrated in the four rifle companies, each organized with a headquarters and three rifle platoons. Each company headquarters is a small scale replica of the battalion headquarters and is designed to command and control the three rifle platoons and a mortar section of two medium mortars. Each rifle platoon, in turn has a headquarters and three rifle sections consisting of a corporal and eight soldiers. This gives each rifle company a strength of five officers and 120 other ranks.

20. The function of the support company of the battalion is to provide operational and administrative support for the four rifle companies. It too has its own headquarters, and is organized into a number of specialist platoons. These platoons provide the battalion with organic pioneers, communications, support weapons and administrative back-up required to carry out the missions to which it is assigned. The strength of the support company is seven officers and 96 other ranks.

21. To satisfy the needs of the peacekeeping specialist role and the airtransportable requirement, particular attention is given to the equipping of the standby forces. The first requirement is to provide the units with the means to maintain good communications. Command and control of the units are exercised through organic radio equipment which is provided down to the lowest sub-unit. Equally important is the

need for the units to have great mobility. All vehicles issued to the units are airtransportable. For this reason, the units are organized on a light scale consisting mainly of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles and  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton cargo carriers. However, no troop carrying vehicles are provided. If the peacekeeping force does not have the capability to provide the mobility required in an emergency, it is customary to attach the required additional transport, either  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicles or helicopters.

22. In short, Canada's standby organization is one designed to meet the needs, both national and international, for deployment of a unit on a peacekeeping type of operation with the emphasis being placed on air transportability. The organization is subject to modification depending on the area in which the units are required to serve, and the method by which they are transported.

### *Military Observers*

23. Each year Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) selects a number of officers from the three environments in the ranks of captain, major and lieutenant-colonel as replacements for those officers who will be completing their peacekeeping tours during the year and to provide a pool upon which to draw for any new tasks which might arise. These officers are checked medically, inoculated for overseas duty and given a series of lectures on peacekeeping during the period February/March at a central location. At the conclusion of this programme they are returned to their units and await posting instructions.

24. Canadian experience in observer missions has shown that observers, in addition to being physically fit, must be proficient in the following as well:

- a. Preparing clear and concise reports on incidents.
- b. Operating radio sets.
- c. Driving  $1\frac{1}{4}$  ton and  $3\frac{3}{4}$  ton type vehicles—both civilian and military pattern.
- d. Operating off a map using a compass.
- e. Administering first-aid; and
- f. Surviving under all conditions of weather, climate and terrain.

### *Training*

25. Canadian experience has shown that United Nations peacekeeping involves the use of military personnel in essentially a noncombat role. In fact, whatever may be the role of United Nations representatives in the field, it will always call for the development, through training, for special qualities in civilians and soldiers alike. As members of an international team, they must extend their loyalty to their own nationality to embrace dedication the Charter and to the Organization. This means that training for United Nations service is of particular importance. Such training should take into account training requirements of individuals as well as of units. Personnel of all categories should be educated in the aims and purposes of the United Nations in its administration procedures, in the significance of its peacekeeping role and most important in the peaceful purpose of specific operations.

26. In tasks of separating opposing groups, supervising truce lines or calming hostile factions, a United Nations soldier will be frequently called upon to exert a mediatory rather than a normal military function. He will be required to display unusual self-restraint often under severe provocation. In many cases an explosive



situation can be brought under control in a non-violent manner—through coolness, good humour and common sense. Behind this self-restraint and common sense there is, however, except in the case of observers, an element of force. The problem of the use of such force in United Nations peacekeeping operations can be a complicated and difficult business, especially for the commander on the spot. But basic principles are clear enough and follow logically from initial premises—a United Nations force is a peace force and there is no enemy to be defeated. The Force is present and operates with the consent of the authorities of the territory on which it is located. The United Nations does not take the initiative in the use of armed force. This means that the use of arms by a United Nations peacekeeping force is permissible only in self-defence and when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed.

27. It follows then that United Nations troops require deep-rooted discipline and a high standard of basic military competence. The best military peacekeeper is a soldier who will keep his head and interpret his orders correctly under any circumstances and who is visibly so fit, disciplined and efficient that his very presence acts as a deterrent to violence. Over and above standard military training that will produce such a man, perhaps the field which requires most emphasis is observation and reporting: all operational personnel should be skilled in the techniques of visual and mechanical observation and in the practice of oral and written reporting.

28. Maritime and air transport units require little technical training for peacekeeping, since their role in this respect would normally be similar to their role in fulfilling other peacetime operational commitments. Some special peacekeeping training is, however, necessary for land forces units. Since Canadian defence policy emphasizes the requirement for mobility to be an inherent part of all land force formations and units, the required transition from other types of operations to peacekeeping operations is not great. Based on current and past involvement in peacekeeping operations, it has been found advisable to expose all headquarters, formations and units of Canadian regular land forces, at every level of command, to some degree of training in peacekeeping or security operations. This type of training amounts to two weeks each year. As a result any unit can be readied for peacekeeping service on comparatively short notice. However, it is emphasized that the degree of specialized or technical training to be undertaken at any given time in the units of Canadian regular forces does vary. For instance, once a unit is designated as a standby unit, it is subjected to intensified training in airtransportability and aspects of peacekeeping for a minimum of two months and a maximum of six months immediately before envisaged deployment on a peacekeeping commitment. In addition, the unit is exposed to a refresher training programme covering those subjects most likely to be of value on such operations.

29. Canadian units follow these steps in becoming airtransportable:

- a. Officers and non-commissioned officers are selected and sent on either refresher or initial courses to provide them with the qualifications to serve as the unit instructors required to teach the principal roles, tasks and general organization of transport air support in the unit.
- b. Unit staff is selected and made responsible for staff planning, organization and documentation for air transported operations.
- c. Unit airtransportability training staff is selected and made responsible for the following:



- (i) familiarization of all unit personnel with the aircraft used by the air force on peacekeeping operations;
- (ii) loading and unloading training, first with mock-ups then with actual aircraft followed by a short familiarization flight in a loaded aircraft; and
- (iii) training in deplaning drills.

30. Units are responsible for their own air movement documentation. As a minimum, the following must be included:

- a. Air staff tables giving precise details of overall quantity of men and equipment to be moved.
- b. Aircraft loading tables detailing specific information on loads to individual aircraft; and
- c. Aircraft passenger manifests giving particulars of every serviceman to be carried in the aircraft.

31. Concurrent with airtransportability training the unit undertakes the training required to prepare it for employment in the various types of peacekeeping operations.

This training gives emphasis to the following:

- a. Crowd control and dispersal;
- b. Use of batons and shields;
- c. Protection of VIPs, convoys, buildings, etc.;
- d. Establishing United Nations military control of an area;
- e. Road blocks;
- f. Organizing a cordon and search;
- g. Urban patrols;
- h. Mounting of guards and picquets; and
- i. Area search.

NOTE: The above training is in addition to normal military training in which regular personnel of the Canadian Armed Forces are engaged throughout their active careers.

32. Periodically standby units undertake refresher training in these subjects:

- a. Communications;
- b. Unarmed combat;
- c. Military engineering;
- d. Security with particular emphasis on stores and equipment;
- e. Sub-unit (section and platoon) tactics;
- f. First-aid;
- g. Hygiene and sanitation;
- h. Map reading to include the use of the compass;
- i. Environmental indoctrination—specific if unit is preparing to rotate on a United Nations task, or general if only on standby.

33. Following the intensive specialist training period, it is customary for troops earmarked for peacekeeping to take part in exercises at the unit and sub-unit level to perfect drills and procedures for peacekeeping operations. Training culminates with a full scale exercise involving warning, concentration, loading, despatch to exercise area, dealing with a series of incidents normally encountered in peacekeeping

operations, reloading and return to home station. Every effort is made to conduct one such major peacekeeping exercise annually.

#### *Canadian Procedure for Providing Peacekeeping Contingent*

34. When the Canadian Government considers it is likely that the United Nations will request Canadian assistance, CFHQ places elements of the standby force on varying degrees of notice to move and specifies the date and time from which preparations for movement will commence. The contingent advance party, including the contingent commander and overseas airfield staffs, must be able to move 48 hours after the effective date and time set forth in the warning order. The standby force advance party and the advance parties of any sub-units allotted for this particular operation must be ready to move on 96 hours notice. The standby force is at seven days notice to move. These times are used for planning purposes; they can, and have been, shortened or lengthened based on the requirements of particular peacekeeping operations.

35. On receipt of the CFHQ warning order, Air Transport Command (ATC) provides its units with as much detail on the operation as possible. One or two alternative routes for deploying the contingent are then selected and detailed air movement plans are prepared for each. Overflight and landing rights for the routes selected are sought. Before the deployment of the Canadian contingent can commence, ATC will have to preposition relief crews, servicing detachments and support equipment at the various en-route bases. In order to be able to guarantee this sort of support on short notice all personnel of ATC are immunized and ready to proceed on any world-wide deployment at any time. The aim is to have the aircraft with relief crews, servicing and support personnel and their equipment, on the way within the first 12 hours after the executive order to serve has been received. Only by taking such action can ATC guarantee that they will be in a position to commence deploying the Canadian contingent within 48 hours. Similarly the naval forces activate their contingency plans to cover the move by sea of the heavy lift items of equipment and stores. To facilitate that aspect of the operation, staff loading tables have been prepared for the ships of the maritime force considered likely to be involved in peacekeeping operations.

36. Once the Canadian Government has made the final decision to provide the peacekeeping contingent, the contingent commander, together with a small reconnaissance party, proceeds by air to the overseas theatre. Based on his review of the situation, the contingent commander will decide whether the contingent available to him is in fact suitable for the task envisaged by the Force Commander. If the contingent commander agrees with the proposed composition of the Canadian contingent, he will so advise CFHQ and an operation order is issued which includes detailed instructions for the commanders of the naval, land and air forces units involved.

37. The stage is then set for the movement of the Canadian contingent to the theatre of peacekeeping operations. The form that the move takes depends on a number of factors. Although all peacekeeping deployments involving Canadian Armed Forces to date have been administrative rather than operational, it is accepted that operational training should be designed to cater for the worst possible contingency, i.e., tactically loaded aircraft are required at the destination airfield and the distance from home station precludes direct flights from Canada. This requires that the air movement be carried out in two phases. Phase One is the same from the departure

airfield in Canada to an advanced base by air force long range aircraft. Phase Two would involve re-loading in tactical type transport aircraft at the advanced base for the air movement to the destination airfield in the theatre of peacekeeping operations. Communications and movement staffs are deployed to maintain the closest of control over the deployment of the Canadian contingent right up to the point where the contingent commander can in fact assure CFHQ that the Canadian contingent is deployed under effective Force Commander's arrangements.





## PART II

### Procedures for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Observer Missions

#### *Introduction*

38. It has always been the Canadian view that more could be done by the United Nations to prepare in advance for future peacekeeping operations and that one means of making such preparation is to study the experience of the past with a view to working out agreed procedures covering those aspects of peacekeeping which are common to operations so far undertaken. The following paragraphs deal with these aspects of peacekeeping under four major headings:

- a. General—primarily concerned with the preliminary stages of launching a peacekeeping mission or force;
- b. Facilities—accommodation, communications, etc;
- c. Services—medical, postal, etc; and
- d. Personnel—selection, appointments, etc.

39. There are other aspects of peacekeeping which are not covered here but which in the Canadian view also deserve study. For example:

- a. Use and roles of United Nations civilian police;
- b. A United Nations headquarters planning section composed of military and civilian personnel;
- c. A staff school to train officials (civilians and military) for peacekeeping tasks;
- d. United Nations publications dealing with peacekeeping tasks, organization, duties, procedures, etc;
- e. Establishment of logistic bases and need for equipment standardization.

#### *A. General*

40. It would appear from past experience that the United Nations might benefit from prior agreement on certain recognized procedures which should normally be followed by the organization and by Member States after a peacekeeping operation has been authorized by a United Nations organ. It should, for example, be possible to make preparations so that the United Nations would be in a position to define without delay the legal conditions under which a given peacekeeping force would operate. To this end, provisional agreement could be reached in advance on the format and main principles of documents such as the Status of Forces Agreement with the host country, the Participating State Agreements, and the Terms of Reference of the Force Commander. General guidelines might also be drawn up in regard to the selection of a Force Commander and his staff, the contribution of contingents by member states, the strength and composition of a United Nations force, the promotion of understand-

ing between United Nations personnel and the people of the host country, command relationships within the United Nations Force standing operating procedures, and training.

### *Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)*

41. In order to discharge its functions effectively a United Nations Force must operate under carefully defined conditions agreed with the host country. It is desirable that these conditions should be agreed before the Force becomes operational, so that the regulations for the Force may be available from the outset. It might be possible to work out in advance a standard SOFA based on the agreements arrived at for UNEF, ONUC and UNFICYP. Particular arrangements which may be necessary to take account of differing circumstances from one operation to another could be agreed separately at the time in the form of a supplemental agreement. Such arrangements might include, for example: liaison with officials of the host country, the location of the Force in the host country, local and foreign currency, etc.

42. Attached at Annex B is a suggested standard SOFA based on previous United Nations experience with peacekeeping but including some additions which in the Canadian view would improve the status of a United Nations Force.

### *Regulations for a United Nations Force*

43. It would follow from the adoption of a standard SOFA that a standard form of regulations for a United Nations Force would also be possible since the latter is based almost exclusively on the former. Regulations arising out of supplemental agreements could be included as an addendum to the regulations.

### *Participating State Agreements*

44. A United Nations Participating State Agreement is the agreement whereby a Participating State formally agrees with the United Nations to place members of its armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations for service with a peacekeeping force. The agreement generally contains details on these points:

- a. Mission of the Force as defined by the authorizing Resolution(s);
- b. Status of Forces Agreement and Regulations—attached for information;
- c. Privileges and immunities—responsibilities of Participating States;
- d. Good order and discipline—responsibilities of national contingent commanders;
- e. Continuity of service—prior notification;
- f. Change of contingent commanders—need to consult;
- g. International conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel;
- h. Claims;
- i. Settlement of disputes—role of tribunal of three arbitrators.

45. It may be possible to have Participating State agreements prepared in two parts:

- a. *Part I—General*—would be prepared in advance and would include those general provisions applicable to all Participating States, mentioned in paragraph 44.

- b. *Part II—Particular*—would include only those provisions which were unique to each Participating State such as size and nature of contingent, expenses, duration of the agreement, any special clauses, etc.

46. Each Participating State would wish to have its own Agreement with the United Nations regardless of whether or not it was in two parts. But the ultimate aim should be to have one agreement for all Participating States. It would reflect the fact there were no major differences remaining such as allowances, accommodation, etc., which could mitigate against a uniform United Nations Force.

*Terms of Reference (Directive) for United Nations Force Commander*

47. The Terms of Reference for United Nations Force Commanders have been issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with the relevant authorizing Resolution and the Status of Forces Agreement. They include any instructions which may be necessary to amplify the Resolution and the subsidiary documents (also referred to as the Mandate). They advise the Commander as to the likely composition of the Force, the role of each national contingent, his relationship with the contingent commanders, etc.

48. The instructions to a Force Commander are not public documents in the same sense as the SOFA or Participating State Agreements. Nor do they lend themselves to standardization in the same way. Nevertheless some of the subjects covered are so important e.g. principles of self-defence, use of force and interposition, that it is for consideration whether any general guidelines can or should be agreed in advance. Whether or not this is thought to be desirable, consideration might be given to reviving the system of an advisory committee to the Secretary-General for each peacekeeping operation.

*Appointment of United Nations Force Commander and other Senior Officers*

49. The decision of the appointment of the Commander of a United Nations Force should take into account the mandate of the Force, views of interested governments and circumstances prevailing at the time. The Commander should be from a country which had adopted a position of strict impartiality with respect to the dispute which had led to the creation of the Force even if that country was not contributing a contingent.

50. Of particular importance among the personal characteristics of the Commander of a peacekeeping operation would be such qualities as: the capability to inspire respect and co-operation from men of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds; a thorough knowledge of the techniques of negotiation; an ability to work well with civilians as well as military personnel; an ability to organize, command and control an organization composed of highly diversified elements; and a firm but patient temperament.

51. Appointments of senior officers of the Force, normally from among states participating in the Force, should also be made having in mind general criteria mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Account would also normally be taken of the relative strengths of the various national contingents.

52. It is essential that the Force Commander and, to a lesser extent, the senior officers of a United Nations Force have a knowledge of how United Nations Head-



quarters is organized, how it operates and what it requires from the field in the way of reports, etc. Three ways of achieving this may be suggested:

- a. Selected possible future Commanders and senior staff officers might be brought to New York for a period of briefing;
- b. The Secretariat might produce a series of papers which would seek to orient military officers on how United Nations Headquarters operates, what essential information Headquarters must have from a Mission or a Force in the field and the form that their reports should take;
- c. When a new Mission or Force is being established, the selected Commander and senior members of his staff could be brought to New York for briefing and orientation.

This last method is perhaps the least satisfactory because of the inevitable shortage of time and the crisis atmosphere which surrounds the formation of a new United Nations Mission or Force.

### *Criteria for Selection of Observers*

53.

- a. The selection of countries from which observers are to be recruited for any specific operation should normally be subject to the concurrence of the host country.
- b. The concurrence of the host country should not extend to the selection of particular individuals which should be an exclusive concern of a participating State and the United Nations.
- c. It is desirable in principle that the composition of observer missions be representative of the United Nations as a whole, keeping in mind the limitation imposed by (a) above and the requirements of efficiency and good working relations.
- b. Current commitments of Member States should be borne in mind when requests are made for additional personnel for a new task.
- e. In so far as is practicable, Member States should receive a fair share of the senior staff and other appointments to observer missions.

### *Factors Affecting Contributions of Contingents by Member States*

54. Individual Member States should consider:

- a. Is contingent as self-contained as possible, i.e. capable of operating on its own for short periods of up to seven days?
- b. Is contingent, whatever its nature, able to protect itself?
- c. Is size and nature of contingent within the Member State's capability of maintaining *in situ* indefinitely?
- d. Can contingent be despatched without delay for extensive re-organization, re-equipping, etc.?
- e. Can reasonable security be provided for the contingent?
- f. Is mandate given to the Force sufficiently clear, especially as regards freedom of movement?
- g. Can United Nations reasonably guarantee logistics maintenance?

- h. Are general conditions and environment suitable?
- i. Is there a reasonable chance of the commitment leading to a solution of the dispute?
- j. Are arrangements for political control of the Force such as to provide reasonable grounds to expect that the Force will be able to operate efficiently?

#### *Factors Affecting Strength of United Nations Force*

- 55. The main military factors are as follows:
  - a. Nature of country, i.e., size, type of terrain, road network, airfields, etc.
  - b. Size, armament and locations of the disputing parties.
  - c. Availability of local resources such as fuel, water supplies, civilian labour, accommodation and repair facilities.
  - d. Likelihood of outside intervention.
  - e. Capabilities of Member States to provide what is required by the Force in the way of military personnel and equipment.
  - f. Financial arrangements.

#### *Factors Affecting Composition of United Nations Force*

- 56. a. Acceptability of contributors to host country.
- b. Capability of contributors to perform task.
- c. Political impartiality of contributors towards dispute.
- d. Desirability or otherwise of equitable geographical representation.

#### *Ways and Means of Promoting Understanding between United Nations Personnel and Host Country*

- 57. Some of the ways and means are as follows:
  - a. Personnel of the United Nations Force and Mission and the authorities of the host country must be familiar with the regulations under which the Force and Mission are operating.
  - b. United Nations personnel must be acquainted with the proper channels of communication for dealing with authorities of the host country and be most careful to ensure that they are used at all times.
  - c. United Nations personnel must refrain from using the press, radio or other public means of expressing personal opinions which might be construed as interference in affairs of the host country.
  - d. United Nations personnel must ensure that the authorities of host country use the proper channels for approaching United Nations authorities.
  - e. The host country may invoke restrictions from time to time not included in the SOFA or other regulations. United Nations personnel must adhere to such restrictions unless directed otherwise by United Nations authorities.
  - f. United Nations personnel must be thoroughly briefed on customs of the host country and its people so as to be able to understand and not offend.
  - g. At every level nothing unexpected should be done without prior explanation.

58. In addition, there are a number of informal guidelines which might be explained by the Force Commander or contingents commanders or both in their orders and instructions to the personnel themselves. These informal guidelines would cover such subjects as discipline, restraint, need for impartiality and respect for civil authority.

#### *Command Relationships within United Nations Force*

59. These considerations will have a bearing on command relationship:
- a. The Mandate or Resolution.
  - b. The composition of the Force.
  - c. National reservations as reflected in terms of reference of individual contingent commanders.
  - d. Diverse capabilities of the elements of the Force.
  - e. Composition of "command and control", i.e., direction, decision, co-ordination, support, as normally applied to disparate contingencies comprising such a Force.
  - f. Adoption of standard United Nations identification.
  - g. Minor details affecting relationships between elements of the Force are best dealt with *in situ*.

#### *Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)*

60. The regulations for the Force will give broad direction on most of the points of concern to national contingents and personnel upon joining a United Nations Force or Mission for the first time. It is assumed that Standard Regulations for United Nations Peacekeeping would follow the adoption of a standard SOFA for United Nations Peacekeeping. SOPs for a United Nations Headquarters, air movement, conduct of operations, report writing, etc, could be developed along general lines since detailed SOPs of a theoretical nature may be the antithesis of what is best in a new situation. Generally speaking national military SOPs if, developed along the general lines laid down by the United Nations, will normally be suitable. Good staff officers have little difficulty in rapidly evolving SOPs to suit specific circumstances. A Force SOP, based on the specific situation, will be easier to develop than will modification from a set of detailed theoretical SOPs.

61. The working language or languages of the Force must be decided at the earliest, so that Commanders and staffs can be selected who are capable of meeting the requirements for language ability. National contingents can function in their own language provided they have personnel on their headquarters who are capable in the language of the Force and this will include radio operators as well. The Force Headquarters must make provision for sufficient interpreters to serve the Force where there is a language problem in the Force itself or between the contingents of the Force and the indigenous people of the host country. Radio links serving the Force as a whole must use the language of the Force.

62. The type, nature, frequency, format and responsible agencies for initiating reports must be carefully detailed at the beginning of the operation. Ideally SOPs should provide the detailed requirements. It may be necessary to modify them to fit



the needs of any special operation; it is easier to do this than to start from the beginning. Some reports will be oral while the incident is in progress while others will be in writing after the incident has been dealt with. In all cases the language of the Force should be used. It may be necessary to conduct some training in reporting during the initial stages of a United Nations operation.

### *Training Generally*

63. It should be possible to produce standard training manuals and course syllabi based on previous United Nations peacekeeping experience, although differences between member states in their recruiting and standby procedures for peacekeeping will affect the nature of the training given. The type of training for peacekeeping given to the Canadian standby force is indicated in Part I (paragraphs 25-33) of this paper.

### *Continuation Training of Contingents*

64. There are two training requirements:

- a. Maintenance of basic military skill at arms; and
- b. Training to meet any eventuality in the theatre.

65. The first training requirement is a unit responsibility carried out under unit officers as time, availability of training areas and ranges permit. The second type of training is a United Nations responsibility and must include all contingents and supporting elements. The procedure to be followed will depend on the nature of the training and could include briefings, seminars, joint exercises, rehearsals, tactical exercises without or with troops, etc. In some cases demonstration teams could be used to show national contingents how they should train to meet certain conditions which have arisen in the theatre. Invariably speed will be essential in this type of training since prevailing conditions will have prompted it. Possibly one contingent will have worked out a procedure that has proven to be successful in coping with a particular type of incident. Rapid dissemination to the rest of the Force is essential. Training *in situ* can be abrasive; careful control and local liaison are essential.

## **B. FACILITIES**

### *Communications within Force and to United Nations Headquarters*

66. Ideally Force Headquarters should have a communications net that links up the national contingents, Field Service Headquarters and Force Headquarters if not for operations, at least for administrative purposes. Periodic meetings of representatives from the same elements of the Force should be held to straighten out any difficulties and to agree to standard procedures. Communications from Force Headquarters to United Nations Headquarters (Secretariat) should be controlled by Force Headquarters in the theatre but national contingents should have access to it for communications to their own Government on national administrative matters such as rotation, replacement, spares, etc. Canada has always been of the opinion that the Canadian contingent should always have a direct channel of communication to Canada for purely Canadian administrative matters. The United Nations should maintain a stockpile of radio equipment sufficient for an observer mission and a peacekeeping force down to and including national contingent headquarters.



## *Transportation*

67. A wide variety exists in the standard of public transportation found in various parts of the world. Travel between home country and the mission area may involve travel in a number of countries and by different means of widely different standards. When travel, particularly air travel, is arranged under United Nations sponsorship, a satisfactory standard of service should be expected. Public carriers unable to provide the required standard should not be used. Once the required standard has been established, all members of the United Nations Force should be authorized to travel under comparable conditions. The standards of service provided should be comparable throughout any journey and similar facilities should be made available to all those travelling on United Nations duty. Ground transportation within mission or Force could be made more efficient if United Nations stockpiled a range of standard vehicles such as jeeps, land rovers, etc.

## *Buildings and Accommodation*

68. Accommodation is required by a United Nations Force or mission for operational, billeting, storage, repair and recreational purposes, in that order of priority. Initially, United Nations Forces must be prepared, equipped and despatched to operate under field scales of accommodation. However, if possible, prior to despatch of a Force, all available information concerning all aspects of accommodation needs is required in order that sound planning may be carried out.

69. The type of information required for such planning is summarized as follows:

- a. Estimated duration of the operation.
- b. Is accommodation available and, if so, type, size, etc.?
- c. Are utilities (light, heat, water) available?
- d. Is a labour force available locally to:
  - (i) bring accommodation to an acceptable national standard, if necessary;
  - (ii) maintain accommodation;
  - (iii) undertake new construction, if required?
- e. If no accommodation is available, with what type of portable accommodation should Force be equipped, i.e. tents, general purpose huts, etc.?
- f. If available accommodation requires work to bring it up to standard, or if new accommodation must be constructed, either with local materials or portable equipment what are costs involved and how long will it take?

70. The host country is required to make suitable accommodation available to the Force but this is not always possible and the United Nations must sometimes make field or other temporary type of arrangements.

## *Storage Facilities (Cold Storage for Perishable Food Items, Fuel, Ammunition, Spare Parts)*

71. Base area storage facilities depend upon the size and nature of the Force and, if warranted, must be established early in the operation. Adequate facilities should be provided by the host country to meet the environmental conditions which prevail in the area. If these cannot be obtained from existing resources, it will be necessary to construct adequate facilities to serve the Force, Generally speaking contingents only

carry sufficient rations, fuel, ammunition and spare parts for seven days operation. Hence the urgency of establishing a stocked base area is obvious; this cannot be accomplished without considerable planning and stockpiling or advanced arrangements or both for access to existing military base stocks in the area. The more equipment of a standardized nature that can be provided by the United Nations the less complicated the supply problem will be. Ideally contingents should only require their personal weapons and clothing; vehicles, equipments and stores should be available in the theatre through United Nations arrangements.

### C. SERVICES

#### *Medical*

72. United Nations medical support organization must be adequate to maintain the national standards of medical care for the various contingents. Personnel should be medically examined and immunized prior to despatch to a United Nations theatre of operations; they must be physically up to standards for their task and employment. The Canadian practice is to despatch a medical officer with a Canadian contingent to ensure Canadian medical standards are met either by using medical support resources of the United Nations Force or by including the required capability with the contingent.

#### *Postal*

73. In the light of Canadian experience gained thus far, it is suggested that:
- (a) A standardization of postal services be sought under United Nations arrangement with Universal Postal Union (UPU).
  - (b) United Nations establish a postal service on behalf of Participating States eliminating the necessity for bilateral negotiation by individual contingents.
  - (c) United Nations postage be used for the prepayment of contingent mail in lieu of national postage.
  - (d) Principles be established for the provision of national postal remittance and saving bank facilities peculiar to contingent requirements.
  - (e) Military logistic aircraft be utilized to the fullest extent for the transport of mail, other than airmail, to and from the Force.

#### *Food Supplies*

74. It is usually more economical to purchase most food supplies locally; local purchase is therefore desirable provided that United Nations standards can be met and shortages for the local population are not created. However, in view of the variety of food supplies required to meet the diets of the national contingents comprising the Force it is generally necessary to purchase some food supplies from outside resources, possibly from the national contingent's home country. Based on past experience the most satisfactory and economical system of supply has been to operate from a supply system already established in the area.

#### *Petrol—Oil—Lubricants (POL)*

75. The problem is to obtain POL products which will meet the standards laid down for the Force's equipment and vehicles. If suitable POL products are not avail-

able locally, then the United Nations Field Service must make arrangements to obtain them or alternatively authorize the contingents to supply their own and claim reimbursement from the United Nations. Here again the variety of equipment and vehicles brought by the various contingents complicates the supply problem. Standardization by the United Nations is the only solution in sight to the problem; this can be effected either by providing vehicles and equipment from a United Nations base depot or by arranging for an individual United Nations Member State to equip the Force from a nearby logistical complex.

### *Maintenance*

76. In order to develop a maintenance and repair facility, the following environmental information is required:

- (a) Climatic conditions, particularly temperature and humidity likely to be encountered.
- (b) Type of terrain, roads, land elevations.
- (c) Capability of local civilian industry for repair by contract.
- (d) Availability of accommodation, such as hangars, garages, etc.
- (e) Availability of electric power including information on voltage and frequency.
- (f) Availability of other sources of repair, i.e. proximity.
- (g) Method of transportation to be used; air, sea, deck cargo.
- (h) Loading and unloading facilities and limitations.
- (i) Languages in use and availability of interpreters.
- (j) Availability of prepared landing strips and air services.
- (k) Availability of standard vehicles and radio equipment from United Nations stockpiles.

77. If maintenance and repair facility provided by one country is to serve others in the Force then this additional information will be required:

- (a) Number and types of vehicles.
- (b) Number and types of weapons.
- (c) Number and types of major equipment.
- (d) Degree of standardization of vehicles and major equipment achieved in standby forces.

### *Welfare and Recreation*

78. The principle here should be that soldiers from each country serving in the same Force and for the same cause should have, as near as possible, the same standard of welfare services and the same standard of recreational facilities. If at all possible the United Nations should provide recreational accommodation, facilities, canteens and canteen supplies, entertainment films and entertainment in other forms such as conducted tours. National contingents should be responsible for providing home news and entertainment, sports equipment, national films, national brands of cigarettes, beer, spirits and canteen supplies of a national character.



79. Should the United Nations not be in a financial position to provide welfare and recreational facilities, then national contingents must make their own arrangements to ensure that the basic needs of the troops are met.

#### *Publicity and Relations with Local Population*

80. Contingent commanders and all troops must be briefed on how to respond to contacts with news media representatives. They should also be briefed on how to respond to contacts with people of the country in which the Force is operating.

81. Members of contingents should be instructed that it is wrong to say nothing at all but at the same time they should not seek publicity. They should be cautioned, however, to speak only on matters which are their direct responsibility.

82. The United Nations should provide a briefing paper on the official United Nations attitude in this regard.

83. It appears that information officers from any national force should not operate exclusively in a United Nations pool, but should work under their own commanders. There should, however, be national representation at the United Nations Force Headquarters when the size of an individual country's contingent warrants this.

84. Subject to the views of the host government and the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (if applicable) each Participating State should be entitled to bring its own correspondents into the theatre and to ration and quarter them with their own troops in order to ensure that the home public gets as detailed a picture as possible.

#### *Accounting Procedures*

85. It is important to adopt one accounting procedure for the theatre from the beginning; that procedure should be the one used by the agency responsible for provision. It should be the responsibility of the provisioning agency to ensure that all contingents are trained in the procedure. Alternatively the United Nations could adopt an accounting procedure for use in all United Nations operations and missions. National contingents and supply agencies would be required to follow it when employed on United Nations tasks. Standby and earmarked contingents could acquaint themselves with these procedures in their training while on standby duty.

### **D. PERSONNEL**

#### *Length of Tours*

86. Length of tours should be based on the nature of the operation, its geographic location, leave facilities, welfare amenities, and local population. Ideally an unaccompanied United Nations tour should be for one year, although in difficult circumstances this could be reduced to six months. National contingents in the past have generally determined the length of United Nations tours by making their own decisions within the limits imposed by the United Nations. Where accompanied tours are permissible, two years should be the minimum and three the maximum. A common length of tour of duty based on the prevailing conditions in the area by all nations



contributing personnel to any given United Nations peacekeeping operation is a desirable objective for reasons of morale, assignment of tasks and administration.

### *Discipline*

87. Contingent commanders have been responsible for discipline matters affecting their personnel in accordance with the SOFA. It would be practically impossible to change this, i.e., to make the United Nations responsible. The main difficulties arise from the variety in punishments awarded by the different contingents for the same type of offense. The United Nations could suggest a scale of punishments to be used provided national contingent commanders have the authority to make such awards. This is a problem that warrants closer examination to determine what can be done to take a more standardized approach to disciplinary matters within a United Nations Force.

### *Leave*

88. United Nations has been reasonable for all operations and missions in the past. Leave regulations have been based on the nature of the task, its geographic location, strength of Force and state of finances. It is suggested that this flexibility be continued and that leave regulations be governed by these same factors in future, if possible without unreasonable financial restraints, but based on 30 days per year. When United Nations leave is authorized, the United Nations should be responsible for providing adequate leave centres and rest areas. Compassionate leave and annual leave should remain entirely the responsibility of each national authority. Annual national military leave should not be taken while troops are serving with the United Nations.

### *Funeral and Burial Arrangements*

89. It is felt that national customs should prevail. Canada does not return its dead to Canada but buries them in the nearest Commonwealth cemetery after funeral rites within the contingent lines. United Nations policy should allow interment in the theatre of operations or evacuation of the remains of deceased servicemen in accordance with national policies.

### *Dependents*

90. The presence of dependents in the area of the United Nations Force is sometimes an added burden on the United Nations and on the individual soldier. It is bound to detract from the primary mission of the Force especially in times of serious tension. However, it is for consideration whether or not dependents should accompany those personnel whose United Nations tours are more than one year's duration and whose normal duties are at the Force or Mission Headquarters located in an area where suitable accommodation is available for dependents.

91. It is also for consideration whether or not the United Nations should pay transportation costs for those personnel and their dependents who agree to remain two

years or more on a United Nations task. The United Nations should establish a policy concerning the move of dependents to each mission area or theatre of operations and should apply this policy equally to all those participating in the operation, both civilian and military. If the decision is that dependents are to be allowed in the area, then the United Nations should pay the moving expenses of all dependents from their home country to the mission area and return.

### *Pay and Allowances*

92. In the past there has been a wide variety of pay and allowance scales in use in the countries contributing to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. This has resulted in members of some contingents having far more money available to them than members of other contingents.

93. National rates of pay are a matter of national concern and these differences must be accepted in the light of the standard of living and the terms of service which exist in the home countries of the Participating States. Disparities are inevitable, and perhaps not as divisive as is sometimes stated. At the same time it seems reasonable and is important for morale that personnel performing similar tasks in a United Nations Peacekeeping Force should enjoy approximately similar financial benefits.

94. In order to achieve the necessary standardization of remuneration, cash payments made to troops in the mission area should be restricted to a realistic level and payments might be the same for all those of equivalent position or responsibility within the Force. The United Nations might establish, for each mission area, a scale of pay and allowances which would provide equal compensation for equal work. Because of differences in rank structure within the military forces of the Participating States, this pay scale should be independent of rank. Pay and allowances to be issued to an individual member of the Peacekeeping Force which is in addition to the standard rate for the mission areas might be withheld from the individual while he is in the mission area. The details and amount of such additional pay and allowances are matters of purely national concern. Individual members of the Force would be permitted to draw from withheld funds when proceeding on leave outside the mission area.

PARTICIPATION OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN  
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND OBSERVER MISSIONS

SERIAL	OPERATION /MISSION	FROM-TO	PRESENT PARTICIPATION	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIF).	1949-to date	Nine military observers and one C-47 aircraft with: three pilots and five ground crew  Total personnel-17	a. During period September 1965 to June/July 1966 the number of military observers was increased to 19. During this same period air reconnaissance and transport support was provided by 117 Air Transport Unit (See also Serial 9).  b. Tour of duty is one year.
2	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO).	1954-to date.	20	Tour of duty is one year with a two year tour optional in some cases.
3	United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).	1956-to June 1967	Nil	a. Initial contribution air communication squadron equipped with Otter aircraft, administrative and communication troops with subsequent addition of reconnaissance squadron. Army base units including signals, supply, transport and repair facilities and 115 Air Transport Unit RCAF for total strength of 1007.  b. As result of reorganization of UNEF the reconnaissance squadron was withdrawn in February 1966.  c. Tour of duty was one year.
4	United Nations Observer Group in LEBANON (UNOGIL).	1958-1959.	Nil	Canadian contribution was 77 all ranks.
5	United Nations Operation in the CONGO (ONUC).	1960-1964.	Nil	In addition to air advisers and air transport support, Canada provided all the internal communications at HQ ONUC and from HQ to districts throughout Congo involving some 316 all ranks including staff officers and administrative personnel.

6	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) WEST IRIAN.	1962-1963.	Nil	Air detachment of two Otter aircraft and five officers and eight ground crew.
7	United Nations Observer Mission YEMEN (UNYOM).	1963-1964.	Nil	Observers and air detachment of two Caribou and three Otter aircraft for total of 36 all ranks.
8	United Nations Force in CYPRUS (UNFICYP).	1964-to date.	879	<p>a. Canadian contingent composed of headquarters element, standby battalion and reconnaissance squadron. Canada also provided personnel, including Commander, for Zone (Brigade) Headquarters for a total strength (before reorganization in 1965) of 1126.</p> <p>b. Zone Headquarters has been eliminated as result of reorganization in 1965.</p> <p>c. Tour of duty—six months.</p> <p>d. Staff officers tours—one year in some cases.</p>
9	United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM).	1965-March 1966.		Canada provided the Chief Officer, Senior Air Advisor and staff, 117 Air Transport Unit RCAF and military observers for a total strength of 112.



## STANDARD STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

*Introduction*

1. The purpose of a status of forces agreement is to establish the legal position of a peacekeeping force and of its members in a host country, and to define the relationship of the force and of its members with the government and the citizens of the host country. On the basis of a status of forces agreement between the United Nations and a particular host country, appropriate detailed regulations can be drawn up to cover the special needs and circumstances of the situation affecting the status of forces in that country. Such sets of regulations, to cover administrative and operative activities of the peacekeeping force, are supplementary to the status of forces agreement itself.

2. The elaboration of and attainment of a general understanding on a standard status of forces agreement now would have considerable advantages in terms of ensuring efficient arrangements for the organization of future peacekeeping operations. In addition, Member States would be aware in advance of the sort of arrangements that could affect them directly if they had occasion to be involved with a peacekeeping operation, either as a host country or as a country contributing personnel to such an operation.

*Definitions*

- 3.(a) "civil authorities" means all state and local, civil and military authorities of the government of the host country who may be required or called upon to perform functions relating to the Force;
- (b) "the Commander" means the Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force;
- (c) "the Force" means a United Nations Peacekeeping Force;
- (d) "the Government" means the government of the host country;
- (e) "host country" means a country the government of which has consented to the presence of the Force on its territory;
- (f) "member of the Force" means an officer or man of the military service of a Participating State placed under the Command of the Commander by that State, and a civilian who is not a national of, nor ordinarily resident in, the host country, who is placed under command of the Commander by a Participating State, or the United Nations;
- (g) "Participating State" means a member of the United Nations that contributes military or civilian personnel to the Force.

*International Status of the Force and its Members*

4. Members of the Force shall respect the laws and regulations of the host country and shall refrain from any political or other activity in the host country incompatible with the international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of these Arrangements or any subsequent arrangements which may be entered into between the host country and the United Nations or any authority duly authorized by the United Nations. The Commander shall take appropriate measures to ensure the observance of the obligations.

5. The Government undertakes to respect, and to ensure respect of, the exclusively international character of the Force and the international nature of its command and functions.

#### *Entry and Exit—Identification*

6. Members of the Force shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from the host country. They shall also be exempt from any regulations governing the residence of aliens in the host country, including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the host country. For the purpose of such entry or departure each member of the Force will be required to have only:

- (a) An individual or collective movement order in the language of the Participating State and in French or in the English language issued by the Commander or an appropriate authority of the Participating State to which such member belongs; and,
- (b) A personal identity card issued by the Commander under the authority of the United Nations showing the full name, date of birth, rank and number (if any), service and photograph of the member concerned.

Provided, however, that in the case of first entry, a personal military identity card issued by the appropriate authorities of the Participating State concerned will be accepted in lieu of the Force identity card mentioned in b. of this paragraph.

7. A member of the Force may be required to present, but not to surrender, his identity card upon demand of such host country authorities as may be mutually agreed between the Commander and the Government. Except as provided in paragraph 6 of this agreement the identity card will be the only document required for a member of the Force.

8. If a member of the Force leaves the service of the Participating State to which he belongs and is not repatriated, the Commander shall immediately inform the Government, giving such particulars as may be required. The Commander shall similarly inform the Government if any member of the Force has absented himself for more than twenty-one days. If an expulsion order against an ex-member of the Force has been made, the Commander shall be responsible for removing the person concerned from the host country.

#### *Arms*

9. Members of the Force may possess and carry arms in accordance with orders issued by the Commander.

#### *Freedom of Movement*

10. The Force and its members together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the host country. The Commander shall, to the extent he considers practical, consult with the Government with respect to large movements of personnel, stores or vehicles to be made on roads used for general traffic. Upon receipt of a request made by or on behalf of the Commander, the Government will supply the Force with such maps and other information,

including locations of dangers and impediments, as may be useful in facilitating movements of the Force. The Government will not establish restricted areas which inhibit the freedom of movement of the Force and thereby prevent it from carrying out the mission for which it was established. Buffer and demilitarized zones will be established where necessary and they will be clearly described in agreements between the Force Commander and appropriate authorities of the host country.

#### *Use of Roads, Waterways, Port Facilities and Airfields*

11. The Force shall have the right to use roads, bridges, canals and other waters, port facilities and airfields without the payment of dues, tools or charges either by way of registration or otherwise, throughout the host country.

12. The provisions of paragraph 10 and 11 shall apply to aircraft and vessels owned or chartered by Participating States when being used to obtain or to transport personnel or equipment destined for or being removed from duty with the Force. The Force shall have the right, without interference, to make provision for such additional facilities as are required by the Force to effectively conduct its operations and to maintain the Force in being.

#### *Communications and Postal Services*

13. The Force enjoys facilities in respect of communications provided in Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Commander shall have authority to install and operate a radio sending and receiving station or stations to connect at appropriate points and exchange traffic with the United Nations Radio Network, and to authorize the installation and operation of communications between national contingents and their home governments for the purpose of maintaining direct communications on national administrative matters, subject to the provisions of Article 47 of the International Telecommunications Convention relating to harmful interference. The frequencies on which any such station may be operated will be duly communicated by the United Nations to the Government and to the International Frequency Registration Board. The right of the Commander is likewise recognized to enjoy the priorities of government telegrams and telephone calls as provided for the United Nations in Article 39 and Annex 3 of the latter Convention and in Article 62 of the Telegraph Regulations annexed thereto.

14. The Force shall also enjoy, within its area of operations, the right of unrestricted communication by radio, telephone, telegraph or any other means, and of establishing the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premises of the Force, including the laying of cables and land lines and the establishment of fixed and mobile radio sending and receiving stations. It is understood that the telegraph and telephone cables and lines herein referred to will be situated within or directly between the premises of the Force and the area of operations, and that connection with the host country's system of telegraphs and telephone will be made in accordance with arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the host country.

15. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to make arrangements through its own facilities or through those of national channels for the processing and transport of official and private mail including parcels addressed to or emanating



from the Force and its members. The Government will be informed of the nature of such arrangements. No interference shall take place with, and no censorship shall be applied to, the official and private mail addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members, by the Government. In the event that postal arrangements applying to private mail of members of the Force include operations involving transfer of currency, or transport of packages or parcels from the host country, the conditions under which such operations shall be conducted in the host country will be agreed upon between the Government and the Commander.

#### *United Nations Flag*

16. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to display within the host country the United Nations Flag on its headquarters, camps, posts, or other premises, vehicles, vessels and otherwise as may be decided by the Commander. Other flags or pennants may be displayed only in exceptional cases and in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Commander. Sympathetic consideration will be given to observations or requests of the Government concerning this last-mentioned matter.

#### *Uniform*

17. (a) Members of the Force shall normally wear their national uniform with such identifying United Nations insignia as the Commander may prescribe.
- (b) Members of the Force may wear civilian dress at such times and on such conditions as may be authorized by the Commander. Instructions relating to the wearing of civilian dress shall be notified to the Government by the Commander who shall give sympathetic consideration to observations or requests made by the Government concerning this matter.

#### *Vehicle, Vessel and Aircraft Markings, Registration and Operating Permits*

18. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force shall carry a distinctive United Nations identification mark and licence which shall be notified by the Commander to the Government. Such vehicles, vessels and aircraft shall not be subject to registration and licensing under the laws and regulations of the host country. Host country authorities shall accept as valid, without a test or fee, a permit or license issued by the Commander for the operation of vehicles, vessels and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force.

#### *Privileges and Immunities of Members of United Nations Secretariat*

19. Members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force remain officials of the United Nations entitled to the privileges and immunities of Articles V and VII of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. With respect to the locally-recruited personnel of the Force, however, who are not members of the Secretariat, the United Nations will assert its right only to the immunities concerning official acts, and exemption from taxation and national service obligations provided in sections 18(a), (b) and (c) of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.



### *Privileges and Immunities of the Commander and Officers of his Headquarters Staff*

20. The Commander shall be entitled to the privileges, immunities and facilities of sections 19 and 27 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Officers serving no the Commander's Headquarters Staff and such other senior field officers as he may designate, are entitled to the privileges and immunities of Article VI of the Convention no the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

### *Privileges and Immunities of the Force*

21. (a) The Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privileges and immunities of the Organization in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The provisions of Article II of that Convention shall also apply to the property, funds and assets of Participating States used in the host country in connection with the national contingents serving in the Force. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to import free of duty equipment for the Force, and provisions, supplies and other goods for the exclusive use of members of the Force and members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force, excluding locally recruited personnel; such right includes the right of the Force to establish, maintain and operate at headquarters, camps and posts, service institutes providing amenities for such members. The amenities that may be provided by service institutes include goods of a consumable nature such as confectionary, tobacco, tobacco products, beer, and spirits, and articles of a non-consumable nature normally sold in military canteens notwithstanding the availability of such merchandise in local commercial outlets. In order that duty-free importation for the Force may be effected with the least possible delay, having regard to the interests of the Government, a mutually satisfactory procedure, including documentation, shall be arranged between the appropriate authorities of the Force and the Government. The Commander shall take all necessary measures to prevent any abuse of the exemption and to prevent the sale and resale of such goods to persons other than those aforesaid. Sympathetic consideration shall be given by the Commander to observations or requests of the Government concerning the operation of service institutes.

(b) Amenities by ways of gifts or free issues of a consumable nature sent to national contingents by Participating States and gift parcels sent by relatives and friends as soldiers' comforts shall be imported free of duty into the host country and shall not affect the quotas, if any, established by agreement between the Commander and the Government.

(c) Movement Control Staffs of the Force or Participating States shall have the right to board and inspect vessels and aircraft used by the United Nations in connection with the transportation of personnel and equipment of the Force.

### *Jurisdiction*

22. The following arrangements, paragraphs 22 to 32 inclusive, respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction shall apply having regard to the special functions of the Force

and to the interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit of the members of the Force.

### *Criminal Jurisdiction*

23. The military authorities of the Participating State shall have the right to exercise within the host country all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Participating State over all persons subject to the military law of that State, and the military authorities of the Participating State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to any criminal offences committed by such person in the host country.

### *Civil Jurisdiction—Claims*

24. (a) Any claim made by;

- (i) a resident of the host country in respect of any damage alleged to result from an act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties;
- (ii) the Government against a member of the Force: or
- (iii) the Force or the Government against one another, that is not covered by paragraphs 30 and 31 of this agreement.

shall be settled by a Claims Commission established for that purpose. One member of the Commission shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, one member by the Government and a chairman jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government. If the Secretary-General and the Government fail to agree on the appointment of a chairman, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either to make the appointment. An award made by the Claims Commission against the Force or a member thereof or against the Government shall be notified to the Commander or the Government, as the case may be, to make satisfaction thereof in the currency of the host country.

- (b) Members of the Force shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the host country or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties.
- (c) The United Nations and the Government shall make provision for the appropriate mode of settlement of disputes or claims arising out of contract or other disputes or claims of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party other than those covered in this paragraph and in paragraphs 30, 31 and 46.

25. The Claims Commission, established under paragraph 24, shall settle claims in accordance with the law of the host country. The adjudication of a claim by the Claims Commission shall be conclusive and binding on all parties concerned.

26. Any person who has a claim against a member of the Force arising out of an act or omission in the host country not done in the performance of official duty, may refer his claim to the Claims Commission established pursuant to paragraph 24. Similarly, a member of the Force who has a claim against a resident of the host country arising out of an act or omission in the host country, may also refer his claim to the Claims Commission. Such a claim or other non-duty claims of which the Claims Commission becomes aware shall be reported to the Force or the Government, as appro-

priate, by the Claims Commission together with an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force or of a resident of the host country, and the reasonableness of the amount claimed. Where appropriate, the Force or the Government, as the case may be, shall co-operate in obtaining a settlement of such claims.

27. Subject to agreement between the United Nations and the Government, cases not falling under paragraph 24 and those not referred to the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 may be decided by the courts of the host country.

28. With respect to claims against members of the Force:

- (a) The courts, the Claims Commission, or other authority of the host country shall grant members of the Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. If the Commander certifies that a member of the Force is unable because of official duties or authorized absence, to protect his interests in a civil proceeding in which he is a participant, the court, the claims agency, or other authority shall, at the request of the Commander, suspend the proceeding until the disability has been eliminated. Unless the court, the claims agency or other authority of the host country in its or his discretion orders otherwise, a suspension made pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed 90 days.
- (b) Where a judgment made against a member of the Force by a court of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force, given by the Claims Commission, under paragraphs 24 and 26 of this agreement has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Government may, without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary-General to obtain satisfaction.
- (c) Property belonging to a member of the Force which is certified by the Commander to be needed by such member for the fulfilment of his official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision or order; other property belonging to a member of the Force which is not subject to seizure under the law of the host country shall also be free from such seizure.
- (d) The personal liberty of a member of the Force shall not be restricted by a court or other authority of the host country in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason.

29. With respect to claims by members of the Force, where a judgment made against a resident of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of the resident of the host country, given by the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 of this Agreement, has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Secretary-General may, where appropriate and without prejudice to the claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Government to obtain satisfaction.

30. All differences between the United Nations and the Government arising out of the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which involve a question of principle concerning the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 30 of the Convention.



31. All other disputes between the United Nations and the Government concerning the interpretation or application of these Arrangements which are not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement shall be referred for final settlement to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, one by the Government and an umpire to be chosen jointly by the Secretary-General and the Government. If the two parties fail to agree on the appointment of the umpire within one month of the proposal of arbitration by one of the parties, the President of the International Court of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint the umpire. Should a vacancy occur for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled within thirty days by the method laid down in this paragraph for the original appointment. The tribunal shall come into existence upon the appointment of the umpire and at least one of the other members of the tribunal. Two members of the tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the performance of its functions, and for all deliberations and decisions of the tribunal a favourable vote of two members shall be sufficient.

#### *Notification and Certification*

32. Where any civil procedure is instituted against a member of the Force before any court of the host country having jurisdiction, notification thereof shall be given to the Commander who shall certify to the court whether or not the matter giving rise to the proceeding is related to the official duties of such member. Where the Commander certifies that the matter is related to the official duties of such member such proceedings shall be terminated.

#### *Military Police—Arrest—Transfer of Custody—Mutual Assistance*

33. The Commander shall take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance of discipline and good order among members of the Force. To this end military police designated by the Commander shall police the premises referred to in paragraph 42 of these Arrangements, areas where the Force is deployed in the performance of its functions, and other areas as the Commander deems necessary to maintain discipline and order among members of the Force. For the purpose of this paragraph the military police of the Force shall have powers to arrest over members of the Force.

34. Military police of the Force may take into custody any person who is not a member of the Force who is found committing an offence or causing a disturbance on the premises referred to in paragraph 42, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authority of the host country for the purpose of dealing with such offence or disturbance.

35. The authorities of the host country may take into custody a member of the Force, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Force:

- (a) When so requested by the Commander; or
- (b) In cases in which the military police of the Force are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member of the Force is apprehended in the



commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence that results or might result in serious injury to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights.

36. When a person is taken into custody under paragraph 34 or b. of paragraph 35, the Commander or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, may make a preliminary interrogation but may not delay the transfer of custody and shall immediately inform the Commander or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, that the person is in custody. Following the transfer of custody, the person concerned shall be made available upon request for further interrogation. However, such an interrogation will be done in the presence of a military policeman of the Force or a responsible member of the Force.

37. The Commander and the authorities of the host country shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences in respect of which either or both have an interest, in the production of witnesses, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over, of things connected with an offence. The handing over of any such things may be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them. Each shall notify the other of the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custody under the provisions of paragraph 34 and 35 above. The Government will ensure that private and public buildings may be searched by the police of the host country who will search for property stolen from the Force and its members and the Government will ensure the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation to the Force or its members which, if committed in relation to the host country armed forces or their members, would have rendered them liable to prosecution. The Secretary-General will seek assurances from Governments of Participating States that they will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences which may be committed against citizens of, or other persons in, the host country by members of their national contingents serving with the Force.

#### *Members of the Force—Taxation, Customs and Fiscal Regulations*

38. Members of the Force shall be exempt from taxation of the pay and emoluments received from their national governments or from the United Nations. They shall also be exempt from all other direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed, and from all registration fees and charges.

39. Members of the Force shall have the right to import free of duty their personal effects in connexion with their arrival in the host country. They shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the host country governing customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in the host country with the Force. However, the Government shall waive or refund customs duty on reasonable quantities of personal property imported by members of the Force for export as gifts or to be taken with the member when he completes his tour of duty in the host State. Members of the Force on departure from the host country may, notwithstanding the foreign exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the appropriate pay officer of the Force certifies were received in pay and emoluments from their respective national Governments or from the United

Nations and are a reasonable residue thereof. Special arrangements between the Commander and the Government shall be made for the implementation of the foregoing provisions in the mutual interests of the Government and members of the Force. Particulars of the regulations of the host country concerning the rights of members of the Force to import duty-free articles for the personal use of the individual are set out at Appendix— (to be provided by host country).

40. The Commander will co-operate with customs and fiscal authorities of the host country in ensuring the observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of the host country by the members of the Force in accordance with these or any relevant supplemental arrangements.

#### *Disposal of Nationally-Owned Materiel*

41. Materiel owned by the Force or by a Participating State may be removed from the host country as a right, but it may be disposed of in the host country only in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that regard between the Commander and the Government.

#### *Premises of the Force*

42. The Government, in agreement with the Commander, shall provide to the Force without cost such areas of buildings in reasonable condition for headquarters, camps, or other uses as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfilment of the functions of the Force. The Force shall have the right to effect such construction, alterations, repairs and improvements as are necessary. Without prejudice to the fact that all such premises remain the territory of the host country they shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Commander. The entry upon such premises by any person including civil authorities shall only be permitted by or under the authority of the Commander. Under normal conditions areas and buildings vacated by the Force shall be left in a reasonable state of repair. However, this last condition shall not apply if the Force is required to vacate the areas or buildings through circumstances beyond its control.

#### *Water, Electricity and other Public Utilities and Services*

43. The Force shall have the right to use water, electricity and other public utilities and services at rates not less favourable to the Force than those to comparable consumers. The Government shall, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining water, electricity and other public utilities and services required, and in the case of interruptions or threatened interruption of service, will give the same priority to the needs of the Force as to essential Government services. The Force shall have the right where necessary to generate, within the premises of the Force either on land or on water, electricity for the use of the Force, and to transmit and distribute such electricity as required by the Force. To the extent necessary to provide for the Force and/or the local population the Force shall have the right to operate waterworks and other public utilities and services.

#### *Provisions, Supplies and Services (Local)*

44. The Government will, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtaining equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods and services required

from local sources for its subsistence and operation. Sympathetic consideration will be given by the Commander to requests or observations of the Government respecting purchases on the local market in order to avoid any adverse effect on the local economy. Members of the Force and United Nations officials may purchase locally goods necessary for their own consumption, and such services as they need, under conditions not less favourable than for citizens of the host country.

#### *Locally-Hired Personnel*

45. The Force may hire local personnel as required. Where necessary the Government shall be responsible for obtaining the personnel to fulfil the labour requirements of the Force. The terms and conditions of employment for locally-hired personnel shall be prescribed by the Commander and shall generally, to the extent practicable, follow the practice prevailing in the locality. The Government shall not require such employees to perform any duties inconsistent with the United Nations mission during their period of employment with the Force.

46. Disputes concerning terms of employment and conditions of service of locally-employed personnel shall be settled by administrative procedures to be established by the Commander after consultation with appropriate authorities of the host country.

#### *Medical, Sanitary and Health Measures*

47. Where medical or dental facilities of the Force are inadequate the Commander may enter into arrangements with the Government for the provision of such facilities locally. The Commander and the Government will co-operate with respect to sanitary services and health, particularly with respect to the control of communicable diseases in accordance with international conventions, and such co-operation shall extend to the exchange of relevant information and statistics.

#### *Deceased Members—Disposition of Personal Property*

48. The Commander shall have the right to take charge and dispose of the body of a member of the Force who dies in the host country and may authorize the authorities of the Participating State to whom the deceased belongs to dispose of the personal property belonging to the deceased and located in the host country, provided that the debts of the deceased owing to persons ordinarily resident in the host country have been settled.

#### *Supplemental Arrangements*

49. Supplemental details for the carrying out of this agreement shall be made as required between the Commander and the appropriate authorities designated by the Government.



## Appendix 7

Working Paper  
26 March 1969

### SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

#### FIRST MODEL: A STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS ESTABLISHED OR AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

*(Submitted by the Representative of Canada)*

##### *Introduction*

1. This Model has been prepared on the assumption that there will be a need in the future for the organization, dispatch and maintenance of United Nations Military Observer Missions and that clearly understood arrangements for the conduct of such Missions will enhance their effectiveness. Taking into account the material submitted by the Secretariat as well as by Governments, the study attempts to outline the problems arising in connection with operations involving United Nations Military Observers, and to formulate suggestions as to how to cope with such problems in the future.

2. During the course of this study the following problem areas have been identified i.e. . . .

3. It is believed that the outline which follows provides a framework within which may be incorporated the guidelines considered necessary for the successful conduct of operations involving United Nations Military Observers established or authorized by the Security Council for observation purposes pursuant to Security Council resolutions.

##### *Chapter I—Authorization*

1. Security Council Resolution(s).
2. Role and Terms of Reference of United Nations Military Observer Missions.
3. Duration and Termination.
4. Concurrence of Host Countries.

##### *Chapter II—Formation and Composition*

1. Appointment of Commander and/or Special Representative.
2. Appointment of Political Adviser(s).
3. Terms of Reference and/or Directives for Senior Officials (Military Commander, Special Representative and Political Adviser(s)).



4. Member States Acceptable to Host Countries.
5. Selection of Participating States.
6. Formation and Strength of Observer Mission.

### *Chapter III—Executive Control and Direction*

#### *Chapter IV—Legal Arrangements*

1. Status of Forces Agreement for Military Observers between United Nations and Host Country or Countries.
2. United Nations Regulations for the Observer Mission.
3. Participating State Agreement Between United Nations and Member States Providing Personnel and/or Material.

#### *Chapter V—Financial Arrangements*

1. Responsibility for Overall Costs of Mission.
2. Responsibility for Costs to Participating States Over and Above the Costs of Maintaining the Same Military Personnel and Equipment in Their Own Countries.
3. Responsibility for Claims Arising Out of Operations Performed in Furtherance of the Mission.

#### *Chapter VI—Organization and Deployment of Headquarters*

1. Organization of United Nations Headquarters.
2. Organization of Observer Mission Headquarters in the Mission Area including Field Service Component.
3. Organization and Deployment of Observer Mission Field Stations in Mission Area.
4. Responsibilities of Each Level and Duties of Senior Staff Elements.

#### *Chapter VII—Operations and Command Functions*

1. Observer Mission Headquarters in Mission Area:
  - (a) Accommodation requirements and layout.
  - (b) Operations review.
  - (c) Duties of personnel.
  - (d) Administration.
  - (e) Training.
2. Command and Control:
  - (a) Channels of communication.
  - (b) Submission of reports.
  - (c) Issue of directives.
  - (d) Liaison with host country or countries.
3. Field stations:
  - (a) Accommodation.
  - (b) Transportation.
  - (c) Communications.
  - (d) Duties of personnel.

### *Chapter VIII—Standing Operating Procedures*

1. General Principles.
2. Patrolling.
3. Supervising Transfer of Personnel and/or Equipment.
4. Investigating Complaints.
5. Arranging Ceasefires.
6. Supervision of Withdrawals and Disengagements.

### *Chapter IX—Equipment, Facilities and Services*

### *Chapter X—Administration for Military Observers on First Appointment*

1. Conditions of Service of Observers.
2. Principal Requirements, Qualifications and Training.
3. Passports and Visas.
4. Medical Examination and International Health Certificates.
5. Travel Arrangements.
6. Transportation, Baggage Shipments, Baggage Insurance.
7. Clothing and Equipment.
8. Mail and Parcels (Personal).
9. Observer Dependents.
10. Subsistence Allowance (Per Diem).
11. Compensation for Death or Disability.
12. Medical and Dental Service.
13. United Nations Medal.

#### *Suggested list of Annexes*

*(Not in any order of priority)*

1. United Nations Definitions.
2. United Nations Abbreviations.
3. Summary of United Nations Observer Missions since 1946 (In chart form).
4. Reference Material (Administrative handbooks, etc.).
5. Aide Memoire for Security Council Resolutions.
6. Aide Memoire for Terms of Reference for Senior Officers/Officials.
7. Aide Memoire for Participating State Agreement.
8. United Nations Regulations for the Mission.
9. Status of Forces Agreement for the Mission.
10. Organization Chart—United Nations Headquarters in New York.
11. Organization Chart—United Nations Observer Mission in the Field.
12. Chart—Channels of Communication.
13. Log Sheets—Operations Room.
14. Log Sheets—Observation Station Post.
15. Investigation Report Form.

16. Incident Report Form.
  17. Overflight Report Form.
  18. Hand-over Report Form (Persons).
  19. Hand-over Report Form (Property and Animals).
  20. Investigating Briefing Order.
  21. Briefing Order Form (For other than investigations).
  22. Operating Procedures for Handling Complaints.
  23. Operating Procedures for Conducting Investigations.
  24. Operating Procedures for Radio Communication.
  25. Extracts for Observers—Field Administration Handbook.
  26. United Nations Charter (Selected Sections).
  27. Aide Memoire for Military Observers.
  28. Patrol Briefing and Debriefing Form.
  29. Military Observers' Administration Check List.
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## Appendix 8

### CONDITIONS REQUIRING CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DESPATCH OF CANADIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ON PEACEKEEPING TASKS—PROVIDED BY MAJOR GENERAL H. TELLIER DEPUTY CHIEF (PLANS), DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

1. In many areas it is difficult to isolate military considerations from political conditions which should be examined with respect to Canadian military participation in peacekeeping tasks. The following are some considerations which are largely military in nature. These are not listed in any order of priority.

- (a) The basic outline organization. Will it be constituted as an observer mission or a peacekeeping force?
- (b) The part the Canadian Contingent is to play. Will it be operational, support, logistic, or a combination of these roles? This and (a) above will have a bearing on the selection of units or personnel.
- (c) Other commitments of the Canadian Armed Forces at the time of the request.
- (d) The basic tasking of the Canadian contribution. Will it be to observe and report upon violations of an agreement only, or will it be expected to influence a return to normality?
- (e) The operational limitations respecting the use of arms. Will the contingent have the right to carry weapons and the right to self-defence? What limitations will there be regards the use of force?
- (f) Will there be an embargo on the importation of armaments into the territory of the disputants so as not to degrade the status quo?
- (g) The responsibilities of the host government for the protection and security of the mission, its members, representatives, installations and equipment.
- (h) The right of free movement for the mission and its members throughout the area of responsibility.
- (i) How will logistic support be provided? What goods, and facilities are to be provided by the host country and under what conditions?
- (j) The right to establish communications for internal mission use and external between participating military forces and their home governments.
- (k) Canadian military representation in staff and command elements within the force headquarters.
- (l) The right of the participating military authorities to exercise within the host country all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Participating State over all persons subject to the military law of that State.
- (m) Immunity for the members from civil jurisdiction of the host country or other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties.



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